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ABSTRACT
Because of the expansion in health information technology and the continued migration
toward digital patient records as a foundation for the delivery of healthcare services, healthcare
organizations face significant challenges in their efforts to determine how well they are
protecting electronic health information from unauthorized disclosure. The disclosure of one’s
personal medical information to unauthorized parties or individuals can have broad-reaching and
long-term impacts to both healthcare providers and consumers. Although several classes and
types of methodologies exist for measuring information security in general, a number of
overarching issues have been identified which prevent their adaptation to the problem of
measuring the confidentiality (the protection from unauthorized disclosure) of electronic
information in complex organizational systems.
In this study, a new approach for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information
in healthcare-related organizations is developed. By leveraging systemic principles and concepts,
an information security system (ISS) for assuring the confidentiality of electronic information in
healthcare organizations is synthesized. The ISS is defined as a complex system composed of the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule information security
safeguards and the people, processes, and technologies that contribute to these safeguards. The
confidentiality of the ISS – a desired emergent property defined in terms of the systemic
interactions which are present – represents the measure of protection from the unauthorized
disclosure of electronic information.
An information security model (ISM) that leverages the structure and parametric
modeling capabilities of the Systems Modeling Language (SysML) was developed for specifying
iii

an ISS in addition to the contained systemic interactions which are present. Through the use of a
parametric solver capability, the complex system of equations which quantify the contained
interactions was executed for the purpose of generating a measure of confidentiality using a set
of user-provided input values – a process referred to as ISM instantiation.

.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Research Objective

The objective of this research is to formulate an approach for measuring the
confidentiality of electronic information in healthcare-related organizations. In the following
introductory chapter, a background on the prevalent issues pertaining to the larger subject of the
protection of electronic information is provided, thereby supplying the relevant context around of
the objective of this research.

1.2

Background and Problem Statement

An electronic health record is a digital representation of an individual’s medical history.
It contains information related to existing and previous medical conditions, diagnostics, and
treatments. In addition, electronic health records contain personally-identifying information such
as social security numbers, demographic characteristics, and account information related to
health insurance billing and payment activity. The major perceived benefits of electronically
storing patients’ personal medical information are 1) reductions in potentially life-threatening
medical errors, 2) improvements in the overall delivery of healthcare services, and 3) reductions
in the long-run cost of delivering these services.
However, despite these advantages, societal concerns regarding the confidentiality of
their personal medical information are prevalent and represent a significant barrier to the wide1

spread adoption and acceptance of electronic health records. In the context of personal medical
information, the term privacy is often used. Privacy is a much broader term than confidentiality,
with implications regarding the “freedom” to control how information about oneself is disclosed.
Confidentiality is a more precise term for this study, as it is related to the concept of “protecting”
information.
The disclosure of one’s personal medical information to unauthorized parties or
individuals can lead to identity theft and healthcare fraud, with long-term financial impacts on
both the patient and healthcare provider. Other concerns regarding confidentiality have broaderreaching implications, such as issues related to the denial of healthcare coverage and
employment opportunities based on one’s personal medical history or demographic profile
(Rindfleisch, 1997). One may also cite less-tangible, but equally significant impacts to
individuals such as the negative social stigma that can accompany specific medical conditions or
treatments.
Because of the perceived benefits, the U.S. Government supports the development of
secure and interoperable electronic health records for most Americans by 2014, in addition to an
overarching Nationwide Health Information Network (DHHS, 2006). The more-recent Health
Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 has further
incentivized the adoption and use of healthcare information technology and electronic health
records. As a result of this expansion in the use of information technology and the migration
towards electronic health records as the foundation for healthcare service delivery, it is
foreseeable that the personal medical information of individuals will continue to propagate
throughout organizations that provide healthcare services. Therefore, it is critical for these
2

organizations to have a thorough understanding of how “well” they are protecting electronicallystored health information.
A typical approach used by organizations for measuring the protection levels of
electronic information in their possession involves determining the degree of compliance with
industry-specific information security standards. These standards seek to measure the protection
level of electronic information from three perspectives:
1) Confidentiality: The protection from unauthorized disclosure of information.
2) Integrity: The protection from unauthorized modification of information.
3) Availability: The protection from loss of information.
One such standard is contained in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996 to which covered entities that receive, maintain, or transmit personal
health information must comply, according to United States Federal law. The HIPAA Security
Rule defines a set of administrative, physical, and technical safeguards for protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information (EPHI)
(DHHS, 2003). Safeguards consist of mechanisms including 1) policies for controlling access to
information resources, 2) software for enforcing and controlling these policies, and 3) physical
protection of computing resources. Their primary purpose is to secure the overall information
technology and processing environment of an organization by protecting information from a
well-known range of threats (i.e. conditions or events that adversely impact organizational
mission via a compromise of electronic information). However, there are several shortcomings
associated with the aforementioned standards:

3

1) Although an organization may be considered “compliant”, there is currently no
standard method to delineate how well the organization is performing in each of the
three protection perspectives: confidentiality, integrity and availability.
2) The lack of standard methods for delineation, as indicated above, underlines the
deeper problem of measurements. Indeed, current information security standards give
no indication as to how organizational components such as people, processes, and
technology contribute to a specific protection perspective.
3) They do not account for the complex and dynamic nature of information security
components.
It results from these observations that information security standards, while recognizing
the importance of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of electronic information, lack
clear, robust and industry-cutting methodologies for measuring them.

1.3

Systemic Perspective on Information Security

As stated in Section 1.1, the objective of this research is to formulate an approach for
measuring the confidentiality of electronic information in healthcare-related organizations. In
this research, a systemic perspective on information security and confidentiality is adopted. By
leveraging systemic principles and concepts, an information security system (ISS) for assuring
the confidentiality of electronic information in healthcare organizations is synthesized. The ISS
is defined as a complex system composed of the HIPAA Security Rule safeguards and the
people, processes, and technologies that contribute to these safeguards. The confidentiality of the
4

ISS - a desired emergent property defined in terms of the systemic interactions which are present
- represents the measure of protection from the unauthorized disclosure of electronic
information.
In the context of healthcare, this systemic perspective is in line with the Institute of
Medicine’s vision for healthcare in the 21st century, which identifies not only electronic health
records as part of the information infrastructure, but also a systems approach for the practice of
healthcare, in which teams of people, processes, and technology interact to achieve desired
performance (Stead, 2009). This research addresses the lack of systemic approaches for
understanding issues and requirements in the field of information security identified by Hessami
and Karcanias (2009), as well as the lack of research related to information security
measurement within the healthcare industry identified in the work of Appari and Johnson (2010).

1.4

Document Outline

The remainder of this document is structured in the following manner: Chapter 2
provides an overview of healthcare information security standards and safeguards, reviews the
state of information security measurement, and presents the common, standard, and experimental
approaches available for measuring information security. In Chapter 3, an approach for
measuring the confidentiality of electronic information is developed which consists of
synthesizing an ISS, and defining confidentiality as an emergent property of this system. In
Chapter 4, an information security model (ISM) is developed for demonstrating the solution
developed in Chapter 3. Chapter 5 discusses ISM instantiation, the process by which the ISM is
5

used for generating a quantitative measure of confidentiality, and provides the corresponding
results and analysis. Chapter 6 highlights the significance and contributions of this research to
the field of information security, and additionally proposes extensions of this research and
directions for future work.

6

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The objective of this chapter is to provide an introduction to healthcare information
security standards and information security measurement. Specifically, an overview of
healthcare-specific information security standards and safeguards is provided in order to define
relevant industry requirements, the general state of information security measurement is
discussed, and the major types of methodologies available for measuring information security are
reviewed.

2.1

Healthcare Information Security Standards and Safeguards

Modern organizations are required to demonstrate compliance with industry-specific
information security standards that are promulgated by overarching laws and regulatory
requirements. With respect to healthcare, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) of 1996 remains the industries principle legislative mechanism regarding
information security. Although HIPAA was primarily established to address a broad array of
healthcare-related reforms, such as the creation of United States Federal Laws related to the
access and portability of healthcare, HIPAA required the Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) to establish standards for the protection of patient information utilized in the
delivery of healthcare services. As such, under the HIPAA Title II Administrative Simplification,

7

the Privacy Rule and Security Rule were established to address the protection of patient health
information. Figure 2-1 provides an illustration of the HIPAA components.

Figure 2-1 HIPAA Components (NIST, 2008)

The HIPAA Privacy Rule, briefly introduced here to clearly distinguish the broadness of
its provisions relative to the more-specific focus of the Security Rule, consists of overarching
protections that govern the disclosure of Protected Health Information (PHI). PHI consists of
information such as an individual’s medical status and treatment history, in addition to account
information related to health insurance billing and payment activity. The HIPAA Privacy Rule is
broad in nature, and PHI can be interpreted as germane to the disclosure health information in all
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forms, including paper-based documents that contain personal medical information or verbal
transmissions in which one’s medical information is discussed.
The HIPAA Security Rule is much more specific and directly addresses the protection of
electronically-stored PHI, referred to as Electronic Protected Health Information (EPHI). EPHI is
a subset of PHI consisting of health information which exists in a digital format. The HIPAA
Security Rule establishes information security standards and safeguards for protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EPHI that is received, maintained, or transmitted by
organizations. Before introducing the specific safeguards identified in the HIPAA Security Rule,
a brief discussion regarding general safeguard concepts is provided.
2.1.1 Safeguard Concepts
Safeguards are the primary mechanisms used for securing the overall information
technology and processing environment within an organization. They are intended to protect
information from a well-known range of threats (i.e. conditions or events that adversely impact
organizational mission via a compromise of information) through the implementation of entitywide processes, procedures, and other broad protection mechanisms. Examples of safeguards are
1) policies for controlling access to information resources, 2) software for enforcing and
controlling the restrictions established by these policies and 3) physical protection of computing
resources.
The fundamental concept surrounding safeguards is that they reduce the likelihood of
threat-vulnerability exploitation. For example, a procedure for processing separated employees is
an example of a typical safeguard present in many information security standards. One of the
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primary purposes of this safeguard is to ensure that when an employee separates from an
organization, their physical and logical accesses (e.g. badges and information system user
accounts) are no longer active. This reduces the likelihood that the separated employee will be
able to access information and resources after they are no longer authorized to do so. Figure 2-2
provides an illustration of this scenario, in which the separated employee is the threat, their
active information system user account is the vulnerability, and the procedure for removing an
employee’s information system access is the safeguard.

Vector of exploitation

Threat
Separated
Employee

Safeguard
Termination
Procedure

Vulnerability
Active User
Account

No longer authorized to
view electronic
information

Steps to be performed
when employment is
terminated

Information system
account not removed or
disabled

Figure 2-2 Threat-safeguard-vulnerability example

Safeguards exist throughout an organization and are intended to establish the
organization’s enterprise-wide approach for protecting the electronic information that it
maintains. This point is emphasized to establish a clear distinction between safeguards and the
individual mechanisms (i.e. configuration settings) that exist within a software application,
referred to as application-level controls. Examples of these mechanisms are software-level policy
restrictions and validation of user input fields. For example, an EHR software application may
10

contain application-level controls for validating user input fields that hold data such as a patient’s
social security number or date of birth to ensure the provided values are correctly formatted or
that they exist in a remote database. Other examples of application-level controls include
network connectivity settings and detailed interface checks (e.g. control totals and hash checks)
for transaction processing. Figure 2-3 illustrates the relationship of safeguards and applicationlevel controls within the organizational environment.

Organization
General Control Environment
Safeguard

Safeguard

Safeguard

 Establishes an organization’s
overarching environment for
protecting information
 Used by all entities within an
organization

 Specific to business applications,
such as EHR software/supporting
hardware
 Contained within software/hw; morelimited overall exposure within
organization

Business Applications
Application
Controls

Figure 2-3 Context of safeguards and application controls

Safeguards establish the general control environment within an organization because they
are applicable to the organization as a whole. The general control environment can be thought of
as a conceptual protection space which surrounds lower level business applications, such as EHR
processing applications.
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While the importance of application-level controls is recognized in the context of total
information security, without effective general controls, application controls may be rendered
ineffective by circumvention or modification (GAO, 2009). This underscores the generallyaccepted notion that even strong application controls are more-easily compromised by weak
safeguards. This point is made to clearly delineate the scope of this research as it relates to the
specific concerns regarding the measurement of confidentiality in an organizational context.
2.1.2 HIPAA Security Rule Safeguards
The HIPAA Security Rule defines three types of safeguards for protecting EPHI:
administrative, physical, and technical. Each safeguard type consists of individual protection
mechanisms intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic
information within an organization.
The safeguards and corresponding information security standards identified in the
HIPAA Security Rule are listed Table 2-1 (Health Insurance Reform: Security Standards; Final
Rule, 2003).

12

Table 2-1 Safeguards defined in the HIPAA Security Rule (HHS, 2003)
Type

Standards

Safeguards

Administrative  Security Management Process
 Assigned Security
Responsibility
 Workforce Security
 Information Access
Management
 Security Awareness and
Training
 Security Incident Procedures
 Contingency Plan
 Evaluation
 Business Associate Contracts
and Other Arrangement

Physical

 Facility Access Controls
 Workstation Use
 Workstation Security
 Device and Media Controls

Technical

 Access Control
 Audit Controls
 Integrity
 Person or Entity
Authentication
 Transmission Security

13

 Risk Analysis
 Risk Management
 Sanction Policy
 Information System Activity Review
 Authorization and/or Supervision
 Workforce Clearance Procedure
 Termination Procedures
 Isolating Health care Clearinghouse
Function
 Access Authorization
 Access Establishment and Modification
 Security Reminders
 Protection from Malicious Software
 Log-in Monitoring
 Password Management
 Response and Reporting
 Data Backup Plan
 Disaster Recovery Plan
 Emergency Mode Operation Plan
 Testing and Revision Procedure
 Applications and Data Criticality
Analysis
 Written Contract or Other Arrangement
 Contingency Operations
 Facility Security Plan
 Access Control and Validation
Procedures
 Maintenance Records
 Disposal
 Media Re-use
 Accountability
 Data Backup and Storage
 Unique User Identification
 Emergency Access Procedure
 Automatic Logoff
 Encryption and Decryption
 Mechanism to Authenticate Electronic
Protected Health Information
 Integrity Controls
 Encryption

2.1.3 Primary Issues
Healthcare information security standards and safeguards are beneficial in that they
establish baseline protection mechanisms which must be implemented by organizations for
adequately protecting electronic information. However, they lack the complement of a standard
approach or mechanism for measuring how well the required safeguards are maintaining any
specific information security perspective, such as confidentiality. This is a significant
shortcoming, as organizations are left to decide how they are meeting these standards and
subsequently are left to develop corresponding measurements of confidentiality. It will be shown
throughout the remainder of this chapter that, although several general classes of approaches
exist for measuring information security in general, a number of overarching issues exist which
prevent their adaptation to the problem of measuring confidentiality in complex organizational
systems.
The next section provides an overview of the state of information security measurement
and discusses how the topic of measurement has been specifically addressed in the literature,
both from a general perspective and with respect to healthcare.
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2.2

State of Information Security Measurement

National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report (NIST-IR) 7564
“Directions in Security Metrics Research” states that most formal approaches for security
measurement and assessment have achieved only limited success (NIST, 2010). The lack of
success with respect to measurement approaches is underscored in the United States Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) 2009 Roadmap for Cyber Security Research which identifies the
need for enterprise-level security metrics as one of the eleven hard problems facing information
security research today (DHS, 2009). DHS and the Information Security (INFOSEC) Research
Council, an organization consisting of program managers that sponsor information security
research within the U.S. Federal Government, conclude that a lack of universally agreed-upon
methodologies for addressing the issue of systems security quantification represents a major gap
in information security research.
Specifically within the healthcare industry, there is an observable lack of research
regarding information security measurement and metrics. Of the 110 different research papers
surveyed by Appari and Johnson in their recent work entitled “Information Security and Privacy
in Healthcare: Current State of Research” (2010), only ten (10) are classified by the authors as
being related to the measurement of healthcare information security and privacy. Table 2-2
provides a summary of these papers.
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Table 2-2 Research related to healthcare information security and privacy measurement (Appari
and Johnson, 2010)
Author
Cheng, Hung
Choudhury, Ray
Dong, Dulay
Ball, Gold
Hu, Ferraiolo, Kuhn
Truta, Fotouhi. Barth-Jones
Truta, Fotouhi, Barth-Jones
Truta, Fotouhi, Barth-Jones
Truta, Fotouhi ,Barth-Jones

Winkler

Year Title
2006 Towards a Privacy Access Control Model for eHealthcare Services
2007 Privacy Management in consumer e-Health
2006 Privacy Preserving Trust Negotiation for Pervasive
Healthcare
2007 Banking on health: personal records and information
exchange
2006 Assessment of Access Control Systems
2004 Disclosure Risk Measures for the Sampling Disclosure
Control Method
2004 Assessing Global Disclosure Risk in Masked
Microdata
2003 Disclosure Risk Measures for Microdata
2003 Privacy and Confidentiality Management for the
Microaggregation Disclosure Control Method:
Disclosure Risk and Information Loss Measures
2004 Masking and Re-identification Methods for PublicUse Microdata: Overview and Research Problems

A review of the publications listed in Table 2-2 indicates that they are related to the
masking of electronic data, or provide technical solutions related to the design of access control
mechanisms. While related to the confidentiality of electronic information, they are more
focused on the technical aspects of information protection. A focus on the purely technical
aspects of information security is an overarching characteristic associated with the existing body
of information security research (Oinas-Kukkonen and Siponen, 2007). Unfortunately, these
types of approaches, although valuable contributions, do not offer solutions that organizations
can use for measuring confidentiality in an enterprise context. The lack of organizational-level
approaches for information security measurement in healthcare is critical, given that it is now
16

well understood that information security is no longer limited to any single technical aspect, but
is in fact germane to an organization as a whole (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000).
The remainder of this chapter reviews common, standard, and experimental approaches
that are available for measuring information security. This will provide an overview of existing
approaches and their suitability for adaptation to the problem as stated in Chapter 1. In addition,
a summary of the underlying issues and gaps associated with existing approaches is provided.
Figure 2-4 summarizes the information security measurement approaches reviewed in this
section.

Approaches for
measuring information
security
Compliance-Based Measurement1
Process-Based Approaches2
System Evaluation Methods2
TCSEC
ITSEC
CC

Dependability Techniques3
Combinatorial Methods

Approach Key:
1- Common
2- Standard
3- Experimental

Attack Trees
State-Space Methods
Model Checking
State-Space Stochastic Methods

Figure 2-4 Approaches for information security measurement
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2.3

Compliance-Based Measurement

One of the most-common and generally-accepted practices within organizations is to
derive measurements of information security from assessments of compliance with information
security standards. The general approach involves the following steps: (1) construct a list of
required safeguards using compliance standards, (2) determine if the safeguards have been
implemented, (3) make a determination regarding the effectiveness of each safeguard, if it has
been implemented, (4) and make a final determination regarding the overall level of compliance.
Figure 2-5 illustrates the basic flow of the compliance-based measurement process.

Compliance
Standard:
Safeguard 1
…

Compliance Report:

Safeguard n
Compare and
Assess

# Safeguards
implemented
% compliant

Organization:
Safeguard 1
…

Safeguard n

Figure 2-5 Basic flow of compliance-based measurement of information security

Compliance-based assessments are beneficial in that they provide a broad perspective
from which organizations can begin to evaluate their approach to information security. In
addition, they are advantageous in that they can be used for demonstrating progress toward
18

compliance with industry-specific laws regarding information protection. This is a critical
concept for organizations, particular those related to healthcare, in which favorable progress can
assist in fostering public trust regarding the protection of personal medical information.
A primary concern with measures of information security generated using compliancebased approaches is that they are typically procedural and subjective in nature (DHS, 2009). The
resulting metrics for information security consist of values such as “percentage of mandatory
safeguards implemented” or the “number of systems reviewed”. More specifically, there is no
standard or generally accepted practice for what exists within the “compare and assess”
component shown in Figure 2-5.
Hulitt and Vaughn (2008) propose a quantitative measure of compliance based on
Pathfinder Networks. The authors show that a quantitative network representation can be
generated of the proximity data of threat-vulnerability pairs in an open-risk model and Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) compliant model of information system
safeguards. The result is a “% compliant” metric indicating the percentage of safeguards
implemented. Their approach is novel in that overcomes the qualitative limitation of compliance
standards. However, although it provides a good measure of information security with respect to
compliance, it is limited by the fidelity of the standard that it uses for comparison. As a result, it
does not provide individual indicators regarding specific types of protection based on the set of
safeguards.

19

2.3.1 Underlying Issues
Because information security standards typically treat information security as a generic
concept, organizations are left to determine how the various safeguards contribute to each type of
protection, such as confidentiality. As a result, it is difficult to determine the level of any single
type of protection provided by a set of safeguards. This is problematic when organizations
attempt to determine where resources should be applied to address industry-specific concerns,
such as confidentiality in the case of healthcare organizations.
Compliance-based approaches also lack the foundation of an underlying model on which
measurements can be based. As noted by Wang (2005), the absence of an underlying model is a
common issue associated with measurements of information security. For example, although the
safeguards shown in Table 2-1 are broadly classified as administrative, physical, and technical,
there is no model that places them in the context of the supporting organizational components
(i.e. people, processes, and technology). In addition, in the practice of assessing information
security it is often the case that safeguards are assessed and related measurements are taken in
isolation as opposed to in the context of a system or network of protection.
Leveraging the example provided in Figure 2-2, it is evident that the effectiveness of
termination procedures is impacted by the manner in which information system accounts are
established. If a user’s access is not formally approved, authorized, and documented, it is less
likely that security personnel will know to remove it upon employee separation. Subsequently,
the account would remain active until detected via another safeguard that addresses the
monitoring and review of information system accounts. Viewing safeguards in an isolated
fashion does not account for these types of interactions and as a result measurements of
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information security are not truly reflective an organization’s ability to maintain the
confidentiality of electronic information. The lack of a foundational model is a primary reason
for the inability of information security measurement approaches to consistently capture these
interactions as part of the measurements and metrics that they produce.
Although it is generally assumed that safeguards apply exclusively to computer and
information systems, a growing body of research indicates that issues surrounding information
security are not limited to technology, but are germane to the organization as a whole (Dhillon
and Backhouse, 2000). Beznosov, Hawke, and Werlinger (2008) discuss the existence of
multiple factors (e.g. human and technical) that introduce challenges to organizations in their
efforts to address information security. Kraemer, Carayon, and Clem (2009) conclude that the
interactions of multiple factors contribute to computer and information security vulnerabilities.
These types of factors are not considered in current information security standards and
organizations are left to determine the context in which safeguards are viewed.
The information security-related legislation and standards associated with other industries
and domains share the same shortcomings as those presented by the HIPAA Security Rule. For
example, the FISMA consists of overarching legislation which requires agencies of the U.S.
Federal Government to implement an entity-wide information security program based on the
standards and safeguards documented in the National Institute of Standards and Technology
Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-53 Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems and Organizations. NIST SP 800-53 identifies management, technical, and operational
safeguards for protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic information
(NIST, 2009). NIST has provided guidance regarding how healthcare organizations can
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implement the HIPAA Security Rule using the same framework suggested for FISMA and NIST
800-53 implementation (NIST 2008). However, like the HIPAA Security Rule, there is no
indication of how the different types of safeguards contribute to each type of protection, nor is
there the benefit of an underlying model that addresses safeguard-to-safeguard interactions or
their requisite organizational contributors.

2.4

System Evaluation Methods

In this section, system evaluation concepts are reviewed, the primary system evaluation
methodologies are described, and their capacity for measuring confidentiality is addressed.
System evaluation methods are used to determine if a target information technology
product or system satisfies some set of requirements for security functionality and assurance.
Security functionality requirements are those that that must be met in order to provide protection
for information (e.g. from the perspective of confidentiality, integrity, or availability) that is
stored, processed, or transmitted by an information system or device. Assurance requirements are
those that must be met in order to obtain credible assurance that security functional requirements
are being met. For example, a computer operating system may implement discretionary access
control (DAC) as a security feature for restricting and controlling access to information.
Accordingly it may have assurance requirements, such as auditing mechanisms and account
review procedures for determining if access control mechanisms are indeed being enforced.
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The measures of information security produced by system evaluation methods are
qualitative indicators that are assigned based on a set of security functional and assurance
requirements that the system fulfills. Figure 2-6 illustrates the general system evaluation process.

Evaluation Criteria
Security Functionality
Requirements
Security features that must be
present to meet information
protection requirements

Information
Technology
Product

Assurance
Requirements

Qualitative
Measure

Mechanisms that must be
present to determine if security
functionality requirements are
being met

Figure 2-6 General context of system evaluation approach

There are three primary standard evaluation methodologies have either been applied in
the past or are currently being used in practice today. They are:
1) The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC)
2) The Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC)
3) The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security (CC)
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2.4.1 Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
The TCSEC was one of the first attempts at a standardized methodology for assigning a
measurement to the level of security provided by a computer system. Referred to as the “orange
book”, TCSEC was the overarching document in the Rainbow Series of computer security
publications developed by the National Computer Security Center for the Department of Defense
(DoD) throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s. One of the primary objectives of the TCSEC was to
provide a metric that would indicate the degree of trust that could be placed in computer systems
processing classified or other sensitive information (DoD, 1985). For example, a computer
system given the measure of TCSEC C1 indicates that it fulfills the combination of security
functional and assurance requirements required for Discretionary Security Protection. The
measures provided by the TCSEC are shown in Table 2-3.

Table 2-3 Summary of TCSEC measures of trust, as found in (DoD, 1985)
Division Name

-

D

Level of
system
assurance &
confidence in
information
protection
capability

C

B

A

+

Class

Minimal
Protection

Contains evaluated systems that
fail to meet requirements for a
higher level of assurance
Discretionary C1: Discretionary Security
Protection
Protection
C2: Controlled Access Protection
Mandatory
B1: Labeled Security Protection
Protection
B2: Structured Protection
B3: Security Domains
Verified
Protection

A1: Verified Design
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The primary evaluation target for the TCSEC is a trusted computing base, defined as the
collection of mechanisms within a computer system that are responsible for enforcing security
policy, such as hardware, software, and firmware (DoD, 1985). As a result, the TCSEC is
primarily focused on the technical safeguards within a computer system, such as those built into
an operating system. In addition, the TCSEC evaluation requirements are largely focused on
access control and the protection of information from unauthorized disclosure. Although this
makes them more applicable to confidentiality as opposed to other types of protection, it does not
adequately address other types of safeguards, such administrative, personnel, and physical,
which exist outside of the trusted computing-base (Chapple, Stewart, and Tittel, 2005). As a
result, the relative contribution of these types of safeguards to confidentiality cannot be directly
determined. This concept is illustrated in Figure 2-7.

Organization

TCSEC

Administrative
Safeguards

Outside of TCSEC

Technical
Safeguards
(TCB)

Physical
Safeguards

Personnel
Safeguards

Figure 2-7 Types of safeguards addressed by the TCSEC

25

2.4.2 Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEC is the result of a European effort to standardize computer security evaluation
criteria and measurement methodologies. Published in 1991 as the Provisional Harmonized
Criteria, the ITSEC was constructed to build on and expand the foundation established by the
TCSEC by addressing integrity and availability, in addition to the confidentiality of information
resources.
The ITESEC provides separate measures for security functionality and assurance, as
opposed to the single consolidated measure provided by the TCSEC. The functional and
assurance measures provided by the ITSEC evaluation methodology and the TCSEC equivalents
are show in Table 2-4.

Table 2-4 ITSEC functionality and assurance measures and TCSEC equivalent (ITSEC, 1991)

Level of
system
assurance &
confidence in
information
protection
capability

+

ITSEC
Functionality
Class

ITSEC
Assurance
Level

TCSEC
Equivalent
Measure

N/A

E0

D

F-C1

E1

C1

F-C2

E2

C2

F-B1

E3

B1

F-B2

E4

B2

F-B3

E5

B3

F-B3

E6

A1
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An advantage of ITSEC over TCSEC is that it is constructed to be more applicable to
whole systems operating within commercial environments, unlike TCSEC which was more
applicable to proprietary DoD computer systems and technical safeguards (Jahl, 1991). The key
indication is that ITSEC does not require that safeguards be isolated within the concept of a
trusted computing base (Chapple, Stewart, and Tittel, 2005). However, although the security
functional and assurance requirements are designed to address confidentiality, integrity, and
availability, indications of the individual types of protection are not discernible from the final
measure.
The ITSEC also explicitly makes the distinction between systems and products, giving
consideration to the notion of an observable and operational environment in which targets of
evaluation reside. ITSEC explicitly states that systems are designed with specific end-user
requirements in mind, and that real-world security threats to them can be determined (ITSEC,
1991). Products are based on more general assumptions, and are designed to fit a number of
environments. In this study, we are interested in systems as opposed to specific products. ITSEC
does not offer a solution for how system environments, presumably subject to complexity and
dynamics, can be accounted for in the evaluation methodology.
2.4.3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (referred to as the
CC), is the latest attempt to standardize security evaluation criteria and methodologies. It is the
current international standard, classified as ISO 15408, and effectively replaces the TCSEC and
ITSEC. The CC attempts to the address confidentiality, integrity, and availability of a Target of
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Evaluation (TOC) through evaluations of security functional and assurance requirements. The
CC assigns a single qualitative evaluation assurance level (EAL) based the results of the
evaluation. The CC EALs are listed in Table 2-5.

Table 2-5 CC evaluation assurance levels (Common Criteria Part 1: Introduction and General
Model, 2009)

Level of
system
assurance
&
confidence
in
information
protection
capability

+

CC EAL

Description

EAL0

Inadequate Assurance

EAL1

Functionally tested

EAL2

Structurally tested

EAL3

Methodically tested and checked

EAL4

Methodically designed, tested, and reviewed

EAL5

Semi-formally designed and tested

EAL6

Semi-formally verified design and tested

EAL7

Formally verified design and tested

The evaluation of a TOC using the CC assumes a 100% correct instantiation of security
objectives for the operational environment in which the TOC resides (Common Criteria Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, 2009). This highlights a deeper issue with system evaluation
methods in general - that they are better suited for the certification and measurement of security
for individual information technology products. As indicated by Whitmore (2001), the CC
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security functional requirements, because of their product-specific nature, are limited in their
ability to describe end-to-end security and their use in complex IT solutions is not intuitive.
Andersson, Hallberg, and Hunstad (2004) propose an extension of the CC for the purpose
of assessing the securability of components in a distributed information system. The authors
propose a weighting matrix that assigns CC security functional requirements to confidentiality,
integrity, and availability for the purpose of generating quantitative metrics. However, the
authors conclude that their method is limited in its current state by the inability to handle the
complexity associated with system-wide evaluations in an operational environment.
2.4.4 System Evaluation Methods Summary
While system-evaluation methods are appropriate for the certification and measurement
of security with respect to individual information technology products, it is difficult to
extrapolate these approaches for complex organizational environments. The underlying approach
of functional and assurance requirements is more-applicable for validating product designs
against vendors assertions of security-related functionality, as opposed to measuring
confidentiality in complex organizational systems consisting of people, processes, and
technology.
While system evaluation methods offer a standardized measure of information security,
the measures are qualitative and broad, and the various types of protection are not discernible
from the final measure. The lack of consideration for the dynamics and interactions among
information security-related elements increases the difficulty associated with extrapolating these
methods for the measurement of security in a containing or organizational environment.
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Additional shortcomings with system-evaluation methods are related to the lack of an
underlying information security model that adequately considers all types of protection and
safeguards, including those related to administrative and physical protection mechanisms.

2.5

Process-Based Approaches

Process-based approaches have also been applied to generate measurements of
information security. The most notable is the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity
Model (SSE-CMM), which is a community-owned process reference model for assessing the
maturity of systems security engineering processes (SSE-CMM, 2003). The general hypothesis
of process-based approaches is that the more mature an organization’s security-related processes
are, the more likely they are to exhibit desirable characteristics.
The SSE-CMM identifies Process Areas for system security engineering, such as
“Administer Security Controls” and “Assess Threats”. Each process area consists of Base
Practices, which are defined as essential characteristics (i.e. activities) that must exist within
security engineering processes. Similar to the systems engineering and software engineering
capability maturing models, the SSE-CMM defines five maturity levels for security engineering
processes. The SSE-CMM maturity levels are identified in Table 2-6.
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Table 2-6 SSE-CMM maturity levels
Maturity

Description

Capability Level 1

Performed informally

Capability Level 2

Planned and tracked

Capability Level 3

Well defined

Capability Level 4

Quantitatively controlled

Capability Level 5

Continuously improving

Keblawi and Sullivan (2007) argue that determining security processes, both effective
and ineffective, may represent a more practical approach for analyzing information security
within an organization than assessments of information security safeguards. Indeed, processes
are an important element of organizational information security. However, processes alone
cannot maintain confidentiality, as their implementation implies interactions with people and
technology.
Huang and Nair (2008) propose a mapping of the safeguard standards identified in the
HIPAA Security Rule to the base practices identified in the SSE-CMM for the purpose of
developing a risk assessment process for patient-centered healthcare systems. Although not
specific to healthcare, Liang and Ming-Tian (2006) use a similar technique for developing a
security evaluation approach based on a mapping between Common Criteria functional and
assurance requirements and the process areas of the SSE-CMM. While novel, these approaches
are subject to the same challenges identified with the compliance-based and system evaluation
methods discussed in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively.
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2.5.1 Process-Based Summary
Process-based methods are advantageous in that they address activities that support
information security. However, the capability of a process alone does not provide an adequate
indicator of information security within an organization. The types of measures and metrics
offered by approaches such as the SSE-CMM are qualitative and broad, and are limited in their
ability to measure information security in terms of the requisite protection perspectives identified
in information security standards, such as confidentiality.

2.6

Dependability Techniques

Dependability concepts and evaluation techniques have been extended for the purpose of
generating measures of systems security. These techniques are similar to those used for obtaining
measures of other system-level properties, such as reliability and safety. Before moving into the
specific types of concepts and techniques being extended, a brief overview of dependability is
provided.
2.6.1 Dependability Concepts
The first formal taxonomy for dependability was published in 1992 in an effort to
synthesize previous research efforts and define standard concepts and terminology for what
constitutes fault-tolerant and dependable computing. Dependability is defined as the
trustworthiness of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service
that it delivers (Laprie, 1992). A service is the system’s behavior as it is perceived by other
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systems (human or physical) with which it interacts. The systems behavior is determined by its
structure.
The concept of dependability has evolved from the foundations documented in Laprie
(1985) to include more rigorous definitions, descriptions, and consideration of security-related
concerns. The continued convergence of dependability and security was captured by Avizienis,
Laprie, Randell, and Landwehr (2004) in their updated taxonomy of dependability and security.
The security and dependability tree is shown in Figure 2-8.

Availabiility
Reliability
Attributes

Safety
Confidentiality
Integrity
Maintainability
Faults

Dependability and
Security

Threats

Errors
Failures
Fault Prevention
Fault Tolerance

Means
Fault Removal
Fault Forecasting

Figure 2-8 Dependability and security tree (Avizienis et al, 2004)

As shown in Figure 2-8, dependability consists of three primary components: attributes,
impairments, and means. Attributes enable the expression of system properties and permit the
assessment of system quality resulting from threats and the means that oppose them. The
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dependability of a system is characterized in terms of its attributes. The security-specific
attributes of dependability are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The definitions for these
attributes are consistent with the standard definitions for confidentiality, integrity, and
availability provided in Chapter 1.
Threats are undesired circumstances under which reliance can no longer be placed on the
service delivered by a system. An example of a typical information security threat was discussed
in Section 2.1.1. Three primary types of dependability impairments are faults, errors, and
failures.
Means are methods that provide the ability to deliver services on which reliance can be
placed. In addition, means assist in achieving confidence in the ability of system to deliver these
services. Means can be thought of as safeguards.
Dependability concepts for information security measurement and evaluation are
advantageous because they are based on more-rigorous system concepts than the other
approaches for addressing information security measurement discussed earlier in this chapter.
Recall that one of the primary shortcomings is that these approaches lack adequate consideration
for an operational environment and the dynamic nature of systems. As noted by Laprie (1992),
dependability concepts are not to be restricted to systems with static and unchanging structures,
but should allow for structural changes that result from threats. This gives rise to the notion of
system states. With respect to information security, we see this in the form of the threats and
vulnerabilities which predicate new protection requirements and safeguards for mitigating the
potential adverse impacts to information resources.
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The two primary dependability evaluation techniques have been extended for the purpose
of generating measures of systems security are combinatorial methods and state-space methods.
2.6.2 Combinatorial Methods
2.6.2.1 Attack Trees
Attack trees (also referred to as attack graphs) are security-related extensions of fault
trees, which have traditionally been used to perform reliability and safety analysis. Like fault
trees, attack trees identify the possible events or conditions that contribute to a system failure. In
the case of information security, a system failure is synonymous with a compromise or breach of
information resources. Attack trees can be represented textually, but are more commonly
represented in graphical form.
The root node in an attack tree represents the ultimate goal of an attacker, and child nodes
(non-leaf nodes) represent the sub-goals that an attacker must achieve for the attack to be
successful. Each non-leaf node is characterized as either “AND” which indicates that a set of
sub-goals must be achieved for a successful attack, or “OR” which indicates multiple ways that a
successful attack can be achieved. Figure 2-9 illustrates the generic structure of “AND” and
“OR” nodes (Moore et al, 2001), and provides a trivial example of an attack tree, in which
unauthorized database access is the ultimate goal of the attacker.
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Figure 2-9 Attack trees (a) AND (b) OR nodes (Moore et al, 2001); (c) simple example

Attack trees are advantages in they can be used to model attack paths for a given system
or collection of systems. Based on the values assigned to the nodes (e.g. time to complete goal,
cost to complete goal, probability of goal completion), measures of information security can be
generated. For example, nodes could represent system vulnerabilities specific to confidentiality,
integrity, or availability. Measures of information security can be calculated by evaluating the
corresponding attack paths.
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2.6.3 State-Space Methods
2.6.3.1 Model Checking
Nicol et al (2004) and Atzeni and Lioy (2005) identify the use of model-checking
techniques as an approach for developing measures of systems security. Model checking
techniques are concerned with the reachability of possible states that are implied by some formal
expression of a system. The general approach involves applying algorithms that explore the
entire state space and provide knowledge regarding the sequence of transitions required to reach
a state of interest. Ammann and Ritchey (2000) present an application of model checking in
which a network security model is constructed using information regarding the interconnectivity
and vulnerabilities of network hosts, in addition to attacker access levels. Model checking tools
are used to explore the state space and identify the specific sequences of transitions that disprove
assertions of security (e.g. the specific sequences of vulnerabilities that must be exploited are
identified).
Model checking is advantageous in that it offers an approach for generating measures of
information security by validating, or conversely disproving security-related assertions. For
example, the number of actions (transitions) required to compromise an information resource can
be used to measure security as a function of attacker effort. However, model checking techniques
are similar to other state-based approaches in that the analytical feasibility is impacted by the
size of the state-space. As a result, caution must be exercised in attempts to scale these efforts to
large and complex systems.
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2.6.3.2 State-Based Stochastic Methods
State-based stochastic methods are advantageous in that they use stochastic modeling
techniques, such as Markov Chains, for addressing the non-deterministic nature of systems. The
ability to capture aspects of system behavior can help to overcome the limitations of existing
formal methodologies for information security measurement.
Helvik, Knapskog, and Sallhammar (2006) use stochastic game theory to compute a
measure of expected attacker behavior based the concept of rewards and cost. System intrusions
(the result of intentional and malicious faults) are modeled as transitions between system states
in a stochastic game. The approach is based an assumption that the attacker has complete
knowledge of all system states, including transitions between states and existing vulnerabilities,
which by the authors admission, is not always the case in real-world applications.
Dacier, Deswarte, and Kaâniche (1996) transform a privilege graph into a stochastic Petri
Net from which a Markov chain describing the potential intrusion states is derived. Security
measures are then derived using a reachability graph. It is the belief of the authors that the effort
and time spent by an attacker are sufficient measures for characterizing security in terms of the
intrusion process.
Trivedi et al (2009) further extend dependability concepts by presenting an extended
classification of threats and mitigation techniques. The authors develop composite model types
for dependability attributes based on the extended classifications. It is shown that these model
types can be constructed and evaluated using the approaches that were identified in Sections
2.6.2 and 2.6.3. For example, a confidentiality-reliability state model is presented by the authors.
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State-based methods can be used to model complex relationships, while capturing state
transition structure and sequencing information (Nicol et al, 2004). However, a disadvantage of
state-based approaches is that complex systems consisting of many components and interactions
can create a large number of potential states. Each state represents a condition that may need to
be addressed through a new security requirement or safeguard, which increases the difficulty
associated with information security measurement (Cunningham and Pfleeger, 2010). A large
number of states, which is predicated not only by systemic complexity but also by the changing
nature of threats to electronic information, represent significant challenges in analyzing models
of “real-world” systems. As a result, exhaustive state models for information security
measurement approaches may be infeasible, and good solutions should be employed to overcome
the associated challenges.
2.6.4 Dependability Summary
Dependability techniques offer a promising approach for security measurement as they
are derived from existing quantitative approaches for calculating system-level properties such as
reliability. In addition, they introduce more-formal system definitions and concepts into the
problem domain of information security measurement. However, as previously discussed, these
methods are currently limited by their scalability to complex systems, particularly in the case of
exhaustive state-space searches.
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2.7

Summary of Existing Methodologies

Table 2-7 provides a summary of the information security measurement approaches
analyzed in this chapter. Each approach is described in terms of the type of measure
(qualitative/quantitative) that it produces, whether it supports a separate measure for
confidentiality, and if the measures are derived from an underlying system model.

Table 2-7 Summary of methodologies and approaches for information security measurement
Approach
ComplianceBased1
TCSEC2
ITSEC2
CC2
SSE-CMM2
Dependability3
Type:1-common

Quantitative/
Qualitative

Exclusive Measurement
For Confidentiality

Measure Derived
from System Model

Mixed

No

No

Qualitative
Qualitative

No
No

No
No

Qualitative
Qualitative
Quantitative

No
No
No

No
No
No

2-standard

3-experimental

2.8

Conclusions

In this chapter, healthcare information security standards and the general types of
methodologies for information security measurement were reviewed. Based on this analysis, it
appears that a standard approach for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information in
healthcare-related organizations has not been established. Although several classes of approaches
and methodologies are available for measuring information security in general, there are
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underlying deficiencies that preclude their direct adaptation to the problem stated in Chapter 1.
These deficiencies are not unique to healthcare organizations, but are representative of the
challenges facing any organization that seeks to measure confidentiality in an enterprise context.
The key issues affecting information security measurement methodologies that were synthesized
from the literature review are identified in Table 2-8.
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Table 2-8 Summary of key issues affecting information security measurement methodologies
Issue

Underlying Cause

Synthesized From

Current approaches do not
delineate how well an
organization is performing
in a particular protection
perspective, such as
confidentiality.

There is a lack of approaches for measuring information security
-General impression
perspectives in the context of an information security model. Current
-HIPAA Security
methodologies typically treat information security as a generalized concept
Rule for EPHI
and information security standards do not provide an approach for measuring
-NIST SP 800-66
the different desired protection perspectives that are identified.
-Wang, 2005

Current approaches do not
account for the
contributions made to a
protection perspective by
safeguards and the
organizational
components of people,
processes, and technology.
Current approaches do not
account for the complex
and dynamic nature of
information security
contributors and
safeguards.

Current methodologies offer little insight into how safeguards, people,
processes, and technology contribute to a system of protection. There is a
lack of foundational models on which measurements of information security
can be based. The lack of a standard or foundational reference models
inhibits consistency across approaches for information security
measurement.

-General impression

Information security is a complex and dynamic concept, in which multiple
people, process, and technology contributors interact with safeguards in
order to protect electronic information. Measurement approaches do not
account for these types of interactions and as a result measurements of
information security are not truly reflective an organization’s ability to
maintain the confidentiality of electronic information.

-General impression

-Wang, 2005
-Vaughn et al, 2001
-Hessami and
Karcanias, 2009

-Cunningham and
Pfleeger, 2010
-Wang, 2005
-DHS, 2009
-Nicol, et al, 2004
-Verendel, 2009
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
3.1

Introduction

In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the problem space surrounding the protection of electronic
information was explored and the key issues as they relate to the measurement of confidentiality
were presented. In this chapter, a solution is formulated which attempts to address some of these
issues. The approach consists of synthesizing an information security system (ISS) from the
HIPAA Security Rule safeguards and the people, processes, and technologies which contribute to
their realization from the organizational space. A desired emergent property of the ISS –
confidentiality - is characterized in terms of the systemic interactions which are present. By
quantifying these interactions, a confidentiality measure is defined which indicates the level of
protection from the unauthorized disclosure of electronic information. This chapter is intended to
establish the solution approach and underlying theory. A system model for demonstrating the
proposed solution is developed and demonstrated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively.
The remainder of this chapter is constructed as follows: Section 3.2 provides an overview
of the solution framework utilized in this chapter. Section 3.3 provides a background on systemic
thinking and information security in order to supply the relevant theory surrounding the proposed
approach for measuring confidentiality. In Section 3.4, an ISS is synthesized by investigating
systemic characteristics that are present within the organizational problem space. Section 3.5
defines an ISS in terms of its properties, and provides the corresponding approach for calculating
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confidentiality. Section 3.6 presents a confidentiality metric based on the measurement approach,
and Section 3.7 concludes the chapter by providing a summary of the work completed.

3.2

Overview of Solution Framework

The solution for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information in healthcarerelated organizations developed in this research is designed to address healthcare information
security standards and to address, in part, the underlying issues with existing information
security measurement approaches. Because the HIPAA Security Rule is the primary healthcare
information security standard, it is critical that healthcare-related organizations are able to
address confidentiality from the perspective of this benchmark. In addition, it is also necessary to
develop a solution which attempts to address the shortcomings with existing approaches for
general information security measurement.
3.2.1 Requirements for Solution Approach
Using the top-level research objective stated in Chapter 1 and the underlying issues with
existing measurement approaches identified in Table 2-8, four overarching requirements for a
solution approach were derived. These requirements frame the solution approach developed in
this chapter and are identified in the following subsections.
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3.2.1.1 Healthcare-Specific Needs
The solution should address the information security standards and safeguards identified
in the HIPAA Security Rule for EPHI. Healthcare-related organizations are in need of better
approaches for measuring information security, specifically confidentiality, as they experience
continued growth in healthcare information technology and migration toward electronic health
records. There are increasing demands for organizations that utilize digital patient information to
demonstrate both compliance with industry standards and to address stakeholder concerns
regarding the confidentiality of personal medical information.
3.2.1.2 Systemic Thinking
The solution should utilize systemic thinking and concepts to address the dynamic and
complex nature of information security. Such approaches are beneficial for investigating and
capturing elements and related concepts in an otherwise disjoint problem space. Systemic tools
and methods are also beneficial for understanding the nature of emergent properties as features
of aggregation in complex systems, and the degree of their presence or absence (Hessami and
Karcanias, 2009). As a result, systemic thinking is a key concept for understanding how
confidentiality emerges from information security-related elements that are present within the
organizational problem space.
3.2.1.3 Protection System Concept
The solution shall consider information security as a system that resides within a larger
organizational system. Current methodologies and approaches for information security
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measurement do not clearly delineate the system providing the security from the system being
secured. Humans, technology, and processes should be considered as part of any measurement
approach for confidentiality as they contribute to protection mechanisms designed to prevent the
unauthorized disclosure of electronic information. In general, security should be viewed in the
context, purpose, and value of the larger system being secured (Fox, Henning, and Vaughn,
2001). In addition, establishing a system of protection facilitates the ability to evaluate this
system in terms of its properties.
3.2.1.4 Delineation of Measurement
The solution shall provide a separate measure for confidentiality. Current measurement
methodologies may address confidentiality, but it’s typically indistinguishable from other
security properties because information security is viewed as a generalized concept.
3.2.2 Solution Framework
Each top-level requirement was mapped into a solution framework, consisting of three
primary steps. Each step corresponds to a component of the solution developed in this chapter.
3.2.2.1 ISS Synthesis
In this step, systemic thinking and concepts are applied to synthesize complex, dynamic,
and emergent characteristics among people, processes, technology and safeguards. The objective
of this step is to delineate the protection system that resides within the containing organization
by capturing systemic elements and interactions that are present.
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3.2.2.2 ISS Confidentiality Measure
The objective of this step is to formalize the structural definition of an ISS, and quantify
the interactions that occur among the safeguard and contributor elements that are present. This
constitutes the approach for calculating confidentiality as an emergent property of the ISS.
3.2.2.3 Confidentiality Metric
The objective of this step is to define a metric for confidentiality based on the
measurement approach. Figure 3-1 provides an illustration of the solution requirement-toframework mapping.

Healthcarespecific Needs

Systemic
Thinking

Protection
System Concept

Delineation of
Measurement

ISS Synthesis

ISS Confidentiality
Measure
Confidentiality
Metric

ISM
Design

Solution
Demonstration

Requirements for solution approach (Chapters 1 and 2)
Solution framework, theory, and development (Chapter 3)
Solution demonstration (Chapters 4 and 5)

Figure 3-1 Mapping of solution requirements to solution framework
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3.3

Systemic Thinking and Information Security

The solution developed in this chapter adopts a systemic perspective on the subject of
information protection, in which information security is viewed as a system with desired
emergent properties. In the context of information security, a “system” is traditionally viewed as
a physical and tangible protection mechanism, such as a network infrastructure device or suite of
access control software. This approach is more-consistent with a “hard” view of systems thinking
which, according to Checkland (2000), assumes that the world is a set of systems (i.e. is
systemic) and that these can be systematically engineered to achieve objectives. For example, a
firewall can be designed based on a set of customer requirements. The combination of hardware
and software that it is composed of can be developed, tested, and configured until it fulfills
specific functional objectives related to the control of network traffic. In addition, business
processing applications, such as EHR software, are representative of these types of systems.
However, organizational information security is a much broader and complex issue.
When attempting to measure information security in an organizational context, one must look
beyond the individual security mechanisms contained within a set of hard, physical systems and
focus on the environment which surrounds these systems. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, this is
referred to as the general control environment and it establishes the organization’s enterprisewide approach for protecting the electronic information that it maintains. This environment can
be thought of as a conceptual protection space which exists throughout the overarching
organizational environment.
A key principle of the approach developed in this chapter is that a solution for measuring
confidentiality subsists within this complex environment and can be synthesized from the
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elements and related concepts which are present. Figure 3-2 illustrates the key elements of the
general control environment that are present within the containing organizational environment.

General Control Environment
Element/Concept
Organizational Environment

C
S

C
C
P

P

P

C
C

Safeguard: protection
mechanisms defined in
information security standards

S

P

C

S

S

Information Security Contributor:
People, process, and technology
contributors to information security
safeguards
Desired protection perspective:
identified in information security
standards (e.g. confidentiality);
intended result of safeguards
Relationship/interaction

Figure 3-2 Information security elements and concepts within the organizational environment

As shown in Figure 3-2, information security safeguards and the people, process, and
technology contributors to these safeguard are present within the organizational environment.
Additionally, desired protection perspectives are indicated as they are the intended result of
implementing a set of safeguards. Although safeguards and contributors are distributed
throughout the organizational space they are interrelated, and an organization’s ability to
maintain desired protection perspectives is dependent upon their ability to function as a whole.
This whole is defined as an ISS, and the desired protection perspectives are viewed as desired
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emergent properties of this system. Specifically, confidentiality emerges due to the structure and
interactions of hierarchical elements (i.e. systems and subsystems) that define an ISS and
delineate it from the overarching organizational environment. As a result, the measure of
confidentiality produced by this solution indicates the degree to which confidentiality exists
within the ISS. This indicator is appropriate as it provides insight regarding the function of a
protection system as opposed to that of an individual hardware or software element, and allows
for a more rigorous understanding of the relationship between the required safeguards and
desired protection perspectives identified in information security standards. In addition, this
approach extends beyond typical studies of organizational information security controls (i.e.
safeguards) which, according to Baker and Wallace (2010), have focused on their presence or
absence, as opposed to deeper investigations of the quality of these mechanisms.

3.4

ISS Synthesis

In this section, the organizational environment depicted in Figure 3-2 is investigated to
identify the systemic elements and interactions that are present and how they lead to the
emergence of desired characteristics. This is essential for delineating an ISS from the containing
organization, and defining the relevant structural and behavioral attributes necessary for property
measurement.
As described by Hitchins (2007), the synthesis of systems with desired emergent
properties yield an evident relationship between the systemic precepts of complexity, dynamics,
and emergence. First, we investigate the types of complex and dynamic characteristics that are
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manifest among information security contributors and safeguards, and then discuss how this
leads to the emergence of desired protection perspectives.
3.4.1 Complexity
3.4.1.1 Contributor-Safeguard Complexity
Although safeguards may vary across information security standards, the elements that
contribute to their realization are not unique, but are fundamental to all organizations.

A

safeguard requires the contributions from one or more information security contributors, which
are defined as people, process, or technology elements. The diagram shown in Figure 3-3
illustrates an example of the typical people, process, and technology contributors to the HIPAA
Administrative safeguard “Access Authorization”

Administrative Safeguard
Access Authorization

Contributes approval

Contributes artifacts
Contributes policy

People Contributor
Data
Owner

Process Contributor
Access Authorization
Process

Technology
Contributor
Workflow
Software

Figure 3-3 Example of information security contributor complexity
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The access authorization safeguard is a standard protection mechanism implemented by
organizations for authorizing (i.e. approving) a users access to electronic information. The
overarching objective is to mitigate the risk of unauthorized access, making it a confidentialitybased safeguard. It involves 1) determining if access is necessitated by job responsibilities and 2)
granting the required approvals in a manner defined by organizational information security
policy.
As shown in Figure 3-3, the access authorization safeguard requires contributions from
people elements (e.g. data owner for providing approval of access requests), processes elements
(the steps that comprise the access authorization policy), and technology (workflow software for
maintaining artifacts of the authorization process). A failed or reduced contribution from any
contributor reduces the safeguard’s efficacy in maintaining confidentiality. For example, the
ability to approve access requests should be restricted to authorized individuals. Otherwise, the
lack of control over who approves access results in a lack of control over who access is granted
to. The resulting condition is an ineffective safeguard, and subsequently a loss of confidentiality
as there is now a reduced level of assurance that access is restricted to authorized individuals.
Also, if proper artifacts are not maintained, access requests and the corresponding approvals
cannot be substantiated, which significantly impacts the ability to perform meaningful
information security audits or after-the-fact investigations necessitated by security incidents
regarding confidentiality.
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3.4.1.2 Safeguard-Safeguard Complexity
In addition to the complexity among information security contributors, there is also
complexity that is present among the safeguards required by information security standards. For
example, the HIPAA safeguard Access Authorization is related to other confidentiality-based
safeguards identified in the HIPAA Security Rule such as “Termination Procedures”
(administrative-type safeguard) and “Unique User Identification” (technical-type safeguard).
Figure 3-4 provides an example of the complexity that exists among the HIPAA information
security safeguards.

Safeguards
Technical Safeguards

Administrative Safeguards
Safeguard
Access
Authorization

Safeguard
Termination
Procedures

Termination Procedures depends on
Access Authorization: If access is not
authorized and documented, it is less
likely that it will be removed as part of
termination procedures

Safeguard
Unique User
Identification

Termination Procedures depends on Unique
User Identification: If users accounts are not
uniquely identified (i.e. shared/group
accounts are used), terminated users retain
logical access after separation

Figure 3-4 Example of complexity among HIPAA administrative and technical safeguards

The illustration shown in Figure 3-4 indicates the types of interactions or dependencies
that exist among safeguards and safeguard types. These interactions are critical to the protection
of electronic information. For example, Termination Procedures consist of the steps (i.e. the
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policy) to be followed when an employee leaves an organization. This safeguard supports
confidentiality, as one of its primary purposes is to remove the logical access of individuals at
which point they are no longer authorized to view electronic information that is maintained by an
organization.
However, an inadequate access authorization safeguard reduces the likelihood that a
user’s access is formally documented, such as when access to specific applications or network
resources is granted without being approved. In this case, it is less likely that security personnel
will know to remove the access upon employee separation, as they would have to review every
application to determine which accesses were held. Inappropriate network access and delayed
termination of employee network access are two common examples of general control
deficiencies that have been identified in DHHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) audits of
existing healthcare organizations for which DHHS has oversight (DHHS, 2011).
Safeguards that address termination procedures are also dependent on the technical
safeguard “Unique User Identification”, which addresses the assignment of unique authenticators
(e.g. usernames and passwords, or access tokens) to information systems users. If adequate
policy and corresponding processes for identity management do not exist, there is a lack of
control over the use of group or shared information system accounts. Group and shared accounts
consist of a single username and password that is shared by multiple individuals. In this case, it
is difficult to remove logical access as part of the termination process as the user may retain
access even after separation, assuming that the group credentials are not modified following
employee separation. Intuitively, this condition is exacerbated when group or shared accounts are
not formally justified, documented, and approved per an access authorization process.
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3.4.2 Dynamics
3.4.2.1 Contributor-Contributor Interactions
The dynamics that exist among information security contributors limit or constrain their
ability to contribute to safeguards, which affects the degree to which safeguards maintain
confidentiality within an organization. For example, if those responsible for approving access
(such as a data owner) do not follow the established authorization process, then the
corresponding process contribution is constrained by the data owner.
Another example of a reduced safeguard contribution exists in instances in which a data
owner creates their own ad-hoc approach for authorizing access, which introduces disparity
within the organizational approach to access authorization. Unique processes created in this
manner may not be thoroughly examined before adoption and may not correctly enforce
overarching information security policy. Figure 3-5 illustrates an example of an interaction
between information security contributors in which a process contribution is constrained by a
data owner.

Contributor
Authorization
Process

Contribution of Authorization Process
constrained by data owner

Contributor
Data Owner

Figure 3-5 Example of information security contributor dynamics
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3.4.2.2 Safeguard-Safeguard Interactions
The dynamics, or interactions, that are present among safeguards are critical for
maintaining confidentiality within a general control environment. As discussed in Section
3.4.1.2, the efficacy of a safeguard may be impacted by the efficacy of a safeguard on which it
depends. For example, if the access authorization safeguard is not receiving the proper
contributions from people, process, or technology contributors, the efficacy of the termination
procedures safeguard is reduced due to dependence that is present among these two safeguards.
The illustration shown in Figure 3-6 provides an example of the interactions among safeguards.

Unique User
Identification

Dependent on

Termination
Procedures

Dependent on

Access
Authorization

Figure 3-6 Example of safeguard dynamics

3.4.2.3 Contributor-Safeguard Interactions
The interaction among contributors and safeguards were detailed as part of the
complexity discussion provided in Section 3.4.1.1.
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3.4.3 Emergence
Emergence is a systems-theoretic concept in which a property exhibited by a system is
not necessarily discernible from any individual system or component of which it is composed.
The existence of emergent properties is predicated on the interactions of contained elements
(systems and subsystems) which are conceptually nested within their parent (i.e. containing)
system. This structure is referred to as hierarchy. Figure 3-7 places the interactions among
information security contributors and safeguards identified in Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 in the
context of a conceptual protection system which resides within a containing organization.

Organizational
Environment
C
S

C
S

P
C
S

S

P

C
S

S

P
S

Contained
Interaction

Systemic element
(contributor)

C

C
C

S

S
Conceptual
protection system
(ISS)

Organizational (containing)
system boundary
Contributor subsystem
boundary

Systemic element
(safeguard)

S

Safeguard subsystem
boundary

Figure 3-7 Conceptual protection system structure and contained interactions
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The existence of a hierarchical structure is evident in Figure 3-7, in which interactions are
present at the contributor, safeguard, and protection system levels, all within the containing
organization. Because emergence is predicated on the structure and interactions of hierarchical
elements, the ISS-level properties can be characterized as emergent and resulting from the
contained interactions within the safeguard and contributor subsystem, and within the ISS-level
boundary. These emergent properties are desired and correspond to the protection perspectives
identified in the HIPAA Security Rule. Therefore, the set of information-security related
properties that characterize the ISS is defined as P = {p1, p2, p3} where:
p1 = confidentiality
p2 = integrity
p3 = availability
Although this study is confidentiality-focused, integrity and availability are identified for
completeness. This point is made to show that a similar synthesis process can be applied for
addressing properties other than confidentiality.
3.4.4 Synthesis Summary
In this section the types of complex, dynamic and emergent characteristics among people,
processes, technology and safeguards were investigated. Using these concepts, an ISS was
synthesized and delineated from the containing organizational space as illustrated in Figure 3-7.
Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 list the types of generalized systemic elements and interactions
identified during the synthesis process, respectively.
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Table 3-1 Systemic elements table
Systemic Element
Information Security
Contributor

Type
People, process, &
technology

Information Security
Safeguard

HIPAA Sec. Rule administrative, physical, &
technical

Description
Element which contributes to
the realization of safeguards
in the general control
environment.
Element which protects
electronic information from
confidentiality-based threats
to the general control
environment.

Table 3-2 Systemic interactions table
Interaction

Type

Hierarchy Level

Description

Contributorsafeguard

Contribution

ISS

Contributorcontributor

Constraint

Contributor
subsystem

Safeguardsafeguard

Dependency

Safeguard
subsystem

Required for realization of
safeguards within the general
control environment.
Occurs among the set of
contributors that contribute
to a specific safeguard and
limits the contributions they
provide.
Required for confidentiality
to be maintained throughout
the general control
environment.

In the next section, the approach for measuring confidentiality as an emergent property of
an ISS using the types of information shown in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 is presented.
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3.5

ISS Confidentiality Measure

The approach for developing a confidentiality measure consists of formalizing the
structure of an ISS and quantifying the associated interactions. This is accomplished using the
results of the synthesis process discussed Section 3.4. The result is a series of relationships and
rules that determine the level of confidentiality within the ISS. Throughout the remainder of this
chapter confidentiality is referred to as p1, as it is discussed in the context of a formal ISS
system-level property.
3.5.1 ISS Formalization
Formalizing the ISS consists of mathematically stating the structural relation of
safeguards and contributors. These formalizations will facilitate the definition of quantified
interactions among these elements which are used for calculating p1.
3.5.1.1 Safeguards
Within the ISS, there exists a safeguard subsystem which contains n safeguard elements.
Let S be the set of safeguards in the safeguard subsystem: S = {Si, Si+1…Sn} for i = 1…n. Any
may be dependent on k other safeguard elements in S as described in Section 3.4.2.2. For
each

, let SiD = {Sd} be the set of safeguards on which Si depends, where d is the ith index

of the corresponding safeguard element in S.
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3.5.1.2 Contributors
Within the ISS, there exists a contributor subsystem. Each

has a set of required

contributions that are provided by a set of m contributor elements existing in the contributor
subsystem. For each Si, the set of required contributor elements is defined as Ci = {Cij, j=1…m}
where Cij is the jth contributor for safeguard i. Within Ci, q constraint interactions as defined in
Section 3.4.2.1 may be present. For each q, let CiIq contain the Cij contributor elements that
participate in the q constraint interactions, where the first element is the element that is
“constrained” and the remaining elements are the “constrained by” elements. Figure 3-8
illustrates an example of the safeguard and contributor formalizations.

S2: k=1  S2D = {S3}
S2: m=2  C2= {C22, C21}
S2: q=1  C2I1= {C22, C21}

Depends on
Contributes to
Constrained by

C21

C22
S2

C11
S1

C12

C31
S3

S = {S1, S2, S3}

S1: k=1  S1D = {S2}
S1: m=2  C1= {C11, C12}
S1: q=1  C1I1= {C11, C12}

C32

S3: k=0  S2D = {}
S3: m=2  C3= {C31, C32}
S3: q=0  C3I= { }

Figure 3-8 Formalized safeguards and contributors (3 safeguard example)
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3.5.2 Interaction Quantification
Calculating a measure of p1 consists of quantifying the safeguard, contributor, and ISSlevel interactions identified in Table 3-2. The result is a series of relationships and rules that
determine the level of p1 within the ISS. This section assumes the notation presented in Section
3.5.1. The following assumptions are also established:


Each

is assigned a confidentiality weight (

), a continuous value in the interval

[0, 1], which corresponds to the degree in which it addresses confidentiality. The intent of
applying a weight is to permit a given safeguard to have more influence in the overall
measure of confidentiality than other safeguards. For example, the access authorization
safeguard would have a higher weight than safeguards which specifically address
integrity-related controls. As a result, the measure of confidentiality should capture this
perceived importance.


Each

is of equal importance to its respective Si. Specifically, no weight value is

assigned to the individual contribution values for a given safeguard. This is consistent
with the underlying theory presented earlier in this chapter, in which the importance of
each type of contributor for a given safeguard was described.


The interactions among contributors are considered on a safeguard-by-safeguard basis.
Specifically, there is no attempt in this study to formulate an organizational-level model
of all contributors. As a result, the interactions defined in each CiIq for a safeguard are
independent of those defined for other safeguards.
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The measurement approach does not attempt to build-in models of human behavior when
considering the interaction among contributor elements. The measurement approach
recognizes the importance of people, process, and technology interactions and attempts to
address the effect on safeguard contribution values predicated by these interactions. It is
envisioned that these types of models could be integrated into the approach developed in
this study as part of future research efforts.

3.5.2.1 Contribution-Type Interaction
Each

has a contribution score which captures the contributor-to-safeguard

(contribution-type, ISS-level interaction) interaction. The contribution score is number of
contribution units present relative to the total required for a safeguard. Each safeguard has m
required contribution units, 1 for each required contributor. Each contributor provides a
value, where

is the contribution value (0 ≤ Cij ≤ 1) of contributor

. The contribution

score of the ith safeguard, assuming equal consideration for each required contributor, is
calculated as:
(3.1)

The intent of equation 3.1 is to quantify the contribution-type interaction without
improperly penalizing or artificially inflating any CSi. An alternative approach for consideration
would be to take the minimum

as the contribution score for a safeguard in order to build

in a “worst-case” scenario. However, this approach would inappropriately penalize a safeguard
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in the overall measure of p1. Consider the example shown in Figure 3-3, in which a standard
“Access Authorization” safeguard requires contributions from people, processes, and technology.
For cases in which an organization maintains paper-based access authorizations as opposed to
maintaining and managing them electronically using software, the

value for technology

would be 0, resulting in contribution score of 0 for the safeguard. However, this would prevent
the contribution score from capturing the fact that access authorization is occurring, albeit not in
the most efficient manner. Using the contribution score presented here is more meaningful in that
indicates a safeguard is supporting overall ISS confidentiality, but at a reduced level than that
which could otherwise be achieved.
Wang and Wulf (1997) have proposed approaches such as the Weakest Length (WL),
Weighted Weakest Length (WWL), and Prioritized Siblings (PS) for capturing the functional
relationships among factors when estimating system security. In this case, adapting and applying
these approaches would lead to selecting the minimum

(WL), applying weight values to

each contributor (PS), or a combination of both (WWL). As discussed above, these approaches
would lead to inappropriately penalizing a safeguard in final the overall measurement, or would
violate the established assumption of un-weighted elements in Ci.
3.5.2.2 Dependency-Type Interaction
When dependencies exist for a Si, specifically when there is a corresponding SiD,
safeguard subsystem-level interactions are present. The net effect on the safeguard’s contribution
score is accounted for by calculating a dependency score (
contribution scores of the safeguards on which it depends:
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) which incorporates the

(3.2)

where:
k is the number of safeguards in SiD
d is the ith index of the corresponding safeguard in S
The score calculation shown in equation 3.2 can be viewed as the minimum of the
safeguard contribution score and a modified contribution score for Si that is calculated against
the maximum contribution score possible for a safeguard complex (i.e. the score for Si and the
scores of all safeguards on which it depends). The minimum is invoked to ensure that the
dependency score for a safeguard can never exceed that of its individual contribution score.
Quantifying the dependency-type interactions is an important concept, as it begins to aggregate
the affects of contributions across multiple dependent safeguards. For cases in which a safeguard
has no dependencies,

is equivalent to

.

3.5.2.3 Constraint-Type Interaction
As described in Section 3.4.2.1, the constraint-type interaction (contributor subsystemlevel interaction) occurs among the contributor elements in Ci, and is viewed as having a limiting
affect on a contributor element’s contributions to a safeguard. It is important to account for this
type of constraint in the measurement concept as it attempts to address the affects that
contributor-contributor friction can have on confidentiality.

65

When this type of interaction is determined to be present among one or more elements, ,
the first element (q=0) of CiIq represents the “constrained” element and all remaining elements
(q > 0) represent the “constrained by” elements. For example, using the illustration shown in
Figure 3-5, the contributor element “authorization process” is constrained by the actions of the
“data owner”. Therefore, if the contribution value of the data owner is less than that of the
authorization process, the contribution value of the authorization process becomes the minimum
of the two values:

(3.3)

where:
is the augmented contribution value for contributor ij (the constrained element)
are the elements in CiIq

In this case the minimum is appropriate, as a constraint-type interaction between
contributor elements indicates that the maximum contribution from the constrained contributor is
limited by the minimum contribution of the contributors with which it is constrained by.
Constraint-type interactions are intended to capture undesirable actions in the contributor
subsystem, and the ISS measure of confidentiality should reflect their existence. The illustration
shown in Figure 3-9 indicates the three types interactions discussed in this section in the context
of the structural formalization developed in 3.5.1.
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1. Contributor subsystem contained interaction (constraint): Contributors interact,
interactions affect contributions to safeguards.
2. ISS contained interaction (contribution): contributors contribute to safeguards.
3. Safeguard subsystem contained interaction (dependency): The ability of a
safeguard to maintain confidentiality is affected by that of any safeguards on
which it depends.
1

C21

C22
2

2

C11

S2
2

2

1

C31

3

3
S1

S3

2

2

C12

C32

Figure 3-9 Interactions and formalized elements in the overall measurement concept

3.5.2.4 Total ISS Confidentiality (p1)
As previously discussed, the existence of emergent properties is predicated on the
interactions of contained elements (systems and subsystems) which are conceptually nested
within their parent (i.e. containing) system. p1 is considered to be an emergent property of the
ISS as its calculation is based on the interactions that occur 1) among elements within the
contributor subsystem, 2) among elements within the safeguard subsystem, and 3) between the
elements in the contributor and safeguard subsystems.
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Total ISS confidentiality is calculated by summing the products of all

values and their

corresponding confidentiality weights, and dividing by the sum of the confidentiality weights:

(3.4)

Applying a confidentiality weight (

) at this stage of calculation allows for the

measure of p1 to be reflect the relative importance of each safeguard with respect to
confidentiality. This also permits a level of control and flexibility from the perspective of
stakeholders in that they can adjust their view of information security (i.e. varying importance of
safeguards with respect to confidentiality), without altering the calculations of a common
underlying model.
3.5.2.5 Units and Scale
The confidentiality measurement scale is based on a minimum and maximum value of
0.00 and 1.00 for p1, respectively. A p1 value of 0.00 indicates the absence of any contribution
from any contributor and a p1 value of 1.00 indicates the presence of maximum contributions
from all contributors. The interpretation of the scale can be viewed as follows: as the total level
of safeguard contribution from people, processes, and technology increases, the measure of p1
increases from 0.00 to 1.00. Most importantly, the measure reflects contribution values that are
subject to the interactions previously defined in this section. In the next section, a metric for
confidentiality is constructed using the information generated by applying the confidentiality
measurement approach.
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3.6

Confidentiality Metric

For an entity of which security is a meaningful concept, there is a set of attributes that
characterize the security of that entity, and a security metric is a quantitative measure of how
much of the attribute is possessed by the entity (SSE-CMM, 2011). In this section, the basic
definition of a security metric as defined by the SSE-CMM is adopted and extended into a
framework that complements the ISS concept developed in this chapter. Figure 3-10 shows the
metrics framework which indicates the relationship among the ISS, its desired properties, and the
corresponding information security metrics.

System (entity)
of Interest

ISS

Focus of this study

Desired
Properties

Information
Security Metrics

p1

Confidentiality
Metric

p2

Integrity
Metric

p3

Availability
Metric

Future research efforts

Figure 3-10 Information security metrics framework

As shown in Figure 3-10, the desired ISS properties represent the foundation for
information security metrics in the proposed metrics framework. Using the p1 measurement
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approach discussed in the previous section, a confidentiality metric is constructed which
provides an indicator of confidentiality within an organization’s general control environment.
3.6.1 Content
The intent of the confidentiality metric is to present stakeholders with an indicator of
confidentiality within the general control environment of their organization. Stakeholders need
not be presented with all low-level details regarding the structure and contained interactions of
an ISS. The value of the metric lies in that it is based on a measure of confidentiality derived
from an underlying systemic model of information security and information confidentiality.
Additionally, the metric should provide an indication of confidentiality in the context of required
safeguards. Therefore, the desirable metric format should show the calculated dependency scores
for each safeguard, their weighted score for confidentiality, and the final measure of p1
calculated using this information.

3.7

Summary

In this chapter, an approach for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information in
healthcare-related organizations was formulated. By adopting a systemic perspective regarding
information security, a system of protection, referred to as an ISS, was synthesized and
delineated from its containing organization. This was accomplished by investigating the
complex, dynamic, and emergent characteristics among information security safeguards and
organizational contributors, and capturing the types of structural elements and interactions that
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are present. Using this information, a set of equations and rules were developed for quantifying
interactions and calculating confidentiality as an emergent property of an ISS. Additionally, a
metrics framework was developed which captures the relationship among the ISS, desired
properties, and information security metrics. In the next chapter, an Information security model
(ISM) is developed for demonstrating the measurement approach developed in this chapter.
3.7.1 Problem to Solution Traceability
In Section 3.2, four overarching requirements for a solution approach were derived. Table
3-3 provides the traceability of these attributes to their implementation in the proposed solution
approach.

Table 3-3 Traceability of problem space to solution space
Solution
Attribute
Protection
System
Concept

Delineation of
Measurement
Systemic
Thinking
HealthcareSpecific Needs

Solution
Concept
The proposed solution delineates an ISS from the containing
organizational system. This logically separates the system
providing the security (ISS) from the system being secured
(organization) and provides a mechanism for confidentiality
measurement (i.e. as an emergent ISS property).
The proposed solution provides a measure of confidentiality and
a corresponding metric.
Systemic principles are the core foundation for synthesizing an
ISS from the organizational problem space and for defining
confidentiality as an emergent system property.
The ISS is constructed using the HIPAA Security Rule
safeguards. The proposed metric provides healthcare
organizations a confidentiality metric which can be used for
addressing stakeholder-specific concerns regarding the
protection of personal medical information.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL
In Chapter 3, an approach for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information and
the supporting theoretical concepts were presented. In this chapter, an Information Security
Model (ISM) is developed for implementing and demonstrating this approach. We begin by first
describing the general ISM concept in Section 4.1. Then, in Section 4.2 the data to be modeled is
defined and in Section 4.3, the ISM is constructed using this data.

4.1

ISM Concept Overview

The ISM is intended to provide a rigorous mechanism for specifying the nested hierarchy
of systemic elements and interactions shown in Figure 3-7. Additionally, the ISM is intended to
be capable of generating a measure of confidentiality using this information as discussed in
Section 3.5. In this section, the concept of a system model which meets these criteria is described.
4.1.1 ISM Requirements
4.1.1.1 Modeling Language
A standard modeling language with strong syntax and semantics is beneficial for
developing, documenting, and conveying system models. Additionally, system models
developed using a standard language provide a consistent presentation and support
interoperability with other similarly-developed models. It is therefore advantageous to develop
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the ISM using a standard, well-established modeling language meeting these criteria.
Additionally, consideration should be given to the availability of commercial software packages
that provide robust modeling environments.
4.1.1.2 Simulation and Solver Capability
As discussed in Section 3.4.2 and Section 3.5.2, contained systemic interactions are a
critical component of confidentiality measurement within the general control environment and
subsequently the ISS. Therefore, the ISM must not only specify the interactions among
information security safeguards and contributors from a qualitative perspective, but must also
provide a mechanism for modeling and executing the quantitative relationships (i.e. equations)
that characterize these interactions.
4.1.1.3 Model Instantiation
The ISM must be capable of being instantiated -- specifically, it must have the ability to
accept a limited set of initial user-provided input values for the purpose of executing all
quantitative relationships and generating a measure of confidentiality. Additionally, it is
desirable that the mechanism for instantiation report the results of all intermediate calculations
used in solving for p1 back to the user. This data is essential for constructing a meaningful metric
for confidentiality that shows not only the final measure, but also provides visibility regarding
the contribution and dependency scores of safeguards.
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4.1.1.4 Extensibility
Because the confidentiality of electronic information is only one view of information
protection, it is desirable that the ISM be constructed to support extensibility to the remaining
information security properties of the ISS identified in Section 3.4.3. Indeed, the general ISM
framework should also support the inclusion of additional information-security related systems
(e.g. a threat system) that may be required to address additional stakeholder concerns regarding
information security.
4.1.2 Implementation
In order to address the requirements identified in Section 4.1.1, the Object Management
Group (OMG) Systems Modeling Language (SysML™) was selected for developing the ISM.
SysML is a general-purpose visual modeling language for systems engineering that provides
standard constructs and diagrams for specifying and analyzing a diverse range of complex
system types, such as organizational systems and those composed of people, processes, and
technologies. SysML re-uses the foundations established by the Unified Modeling Language 2
(UML 2), OMG’s widely-used visual modeling language for software intensive systems, and
extends it to address the specific needs of systems engineering. In addition to a rigorous
hierarchical structural modeling capability, SysML provides a parametric diagramming
capability for modeling the relationships among quantitative system properties. Using external
solving tools, it is possible to execute complex systems of equations defined using SysML
parametric diagrams therefore bridging the gap between design and analysis models.
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4.1.2.1 Software
The following software packages were selected for constructing and instantiating the
ISM. These packages consist of a SysML modeling environment and the additional software
components necessary for executing SysML parametric diagrams and solving systems of
equations. Each software package is described below:


Artisan Studio® Version 7.2.23: A commercially-available, enterprise-grade tool suite
for building systems and software models using OMG SysML and UML. Upon inquiry, a
fully-functional version of this software was provided for use in this study (60-day
temporary license) by the vendor, Atego™. Artisan Studio® provides a SysML modeling
environment and represents the primary application used for constructing the ISM.



Artisan Studio® ParaSolverTM Version 7.2 R1: Plug-in software for executing SysML
parametric diagrams developed using Artisan Studio®. ParaSolverTM provides an
interface between SysML models constructed using Artisan Studio® and external solver
engines. It parses structure, parametric, and instance data specified in the ISM to the
external solver and provides an application browser for solving and viewing results.
Upon inquiry, a fully-functional version of this software was provided for use in this
study (60-day temporary license) by the vendor, Atego™.



Wolfram Mathematica® Version 8.0: Industrial-grade computational software and a core
solver utilized by ParaSolver. This application is used for solving the system of equations
defined using SysML parametric diagrams. A fully-functional version of this software
was acquired on a 15-day trial license from the vendor website. ParaSolver also supports
the use of OpenModelica, an open-source simulation environment based on the Modelica
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language, as a core solver. As part of this study, both core solvers were evaluated and the
decision to use Wolfram Mathematica was predicated by the observation of
OpenModelica application errors (i.e. internal class casting errors) that were generated
during some model instantiations. It is noted that these errors were not generated by
Mathematica during executions of the same model.
4.1.3 ISM Construction and Usage
As discussed earlier in this section, the intent of the ISM is to specify an ISS and generate
a measure of confidentiality through model instantiation. The following steps encapsulate this
concept:
1) Define the domain data to be modeled. Domain data consists of the HIPAA Security
Rule Safeguards, the associated people, process, and technology contributors, and all
associated interactions. The set of domain is generated by expanding the general types
of systemic elements and interaction identified in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2.
2) Construct the ISM. The ISM is consists of two sub-models: a structure (or schema)
model and an instance model. The structure model defines the basic structural
components, properties, and associations of an ISS in addition to the parametric
relationships among system properties. The instance model defines a specific instance
of the structure model which contains slots for holding user-provided and calculated
values for quantitative properties defined in the structure model.
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3) Instantiate the ISM by providing a set of input contribution values and safeguard
confidentiality weights, and solving for p1 using ParaSolver. Figure 4-1 provides a
context figure of the ISM concept.

ISM
(System Model)

Domain data
(For ISM construction):
– HIPAA Security Rule
safeguards
– People, process, and
technology contributors
– Interactions

– Block definition
diagrams
– Parametric diagrams

Structure
Model

User Inputs
(For ISM instantiation):
– Contribution values for
contributors
– Confidentiality weights
for safeguards

SysML Artifacts

Instance
Model

– Object (instance)
diagram

Figure 4-1 ISM concept overview

4.2

Domain Data

This section documents the domain data to be modeled in the ISM. Specifically, the
HIPAA Security Rule safeguards, their respective people, process, and technology contributors,
and all associated interactions are identified. This data is the result of expanding the general
types of elements and interactions identified in Table 3-1 and Table 3-2. What is referred to here
as domain data differs from user-input data in that domain data is used for model construction,
whereas user-input data is used for model instantiation.
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4.2.1 Contributors
4.2.1.1 Nomenclature
A global set of 46 information security contributors consisting of the common people,
process, and technology elements found in practice was identified. The global contributor set is
intended to be representative of the common contributors required by a set of information
security safeguards. Each contributor was assigned an identifier consisting of the following
format: C- <type>-<#>, where C indicates the systemic element type, in this case, a contributor,
type indicates the general type of contributor, with “Pe”, “Pr”, and “Te” indicating people,
process, and technology contributors, respectively and # represents a two-digit numeric index
assigned to each contributor for a given a type. Identifiers were used to provide a consistent and
efficient way for referencing each contributor element. The list of global contributors is shown in
Table 4-1.
4.2.2 Safeguards
4.2.2.1 Nomenclature
Each of the 36 HIPAA Security Rule safeguards shown in Table 2-1 were assigned a
unique identifier consisting of the following format: S-<type>-<#>, where S indicates the
systemic element type, in this case a safeguard, type indicates the type of safeguard as identified
by the HIPAA Security Rule, with “Adm”, “Phy”, and “Tec” indicating administrative, physical,
and technical safeguards, respectively and # represents a two-digit numeric index assigned to
each safeguard for a given a type. Like contributors, identifiers were used to provide a consistent
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and efficient way for referencing each safeguard element within the ISM. Each safeguard and its
respective identifier can be seen in the left-most column of Table 4-2.

Table 4-1 Global contributor data
Contributor Element

Type

ID

Contributor Element

Organizational management
IT security management
Human resources
Data owner
System administrator
Application administrator
Application owner
Contracts management
System users
Application users
Facilities management
Facility security
Operations management
Risk analysis process
Risk management plan
Sanction process
Account review process
Access Authorization process
Termination procedures
External business processes
Access establishment process
Access modification process
Access removal process

People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
People
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process
Process

C-Pe-01
C-Pe-02
C-Pe-03
C-Pe-04
C-Pe-05
C-Pe-06
C-Pe-07
C-Pe-08
C-Pe-09
C-Pe-10
C-Pe-11
C-Pe-12
C-Pe-13
C-Pr-01
C-Pr-02
C-Pr-03
C-Pr-04
C-Pr-05
C-Pr-06
C-Pr-07
C-Pr-08
C-Pr-09
C-Pr-10

Training & refresher process
Antivirus signature update process
Password maintenance procedures
Incident response procedures
Testing and revision process
Criticality ranking process
Physical access process
Maintenance process
Disposal & sanitization process
I&A process
Emergency access process
Backup and storage process
Resource accountability process
Risk analysis software
Authorization tracking software
Audit reduction software
Security training software
Antivirus software
System software
Application software
Backup software
Property tracking software
Sanitization tools/software

Type

ID

Process
C-Pr-11
Process
C-Pr-12
Process
C-Pr-13
Process
C-Pr-14
Process
C-Pr-15
Process
C-Pr-16
Process
C-Pr-17
Process
C-Pr-18
Process
C-Pr-19
Process
C-Pr-20
Process
C-Pr-21
Process
C-Pr-22
Process
C-Pr-23
Technology C-Te-01
Technology C-Te-02
Technology C-Te-03
Technology C-Te-04
Technology C-Te-05
Technology C-Te-06
Technology C-Te-07
Technology C-Te-08
Technology C-Te-09
Technology C-Te-10

4.2.3 Interactions
4.2.3.1 Dependency-Type
While safeguards are documented in information security standards, the interactions (i.e.
dependencies) that are present among them must be determined. As discussed in Chapter 3,
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safeguard-to-safeguard interactions are dependency-type relationships present within the general
control environment, indicating that the efficacy of a specific safeguard is affected by the
efficacy of any safeguard on which it depends. For this study, the interactions among safeguards
were identified by first determining the definition, purpose, and intent of each safeguard.
Because the definition of a specific safeguard can vary across information security standards, the
guidance provided in NIST SP 800-66 An Introductory Resource for Implementing the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Security Rule (NIST, 2008) was leveraged
for clarification of safeguard definitions with respect to the HIPAA Security Rule. Next, this
knowledge, along with the authors experience in evaluating information security safeguards in
practice, was used for determining the dependencies among each safeguard. Although the
dependencies are relative to the HIPAA Security Rule safeguards, they are generally
representative of those that would exist among the common safeguards of other information
security standards and problem domains.
4.2.3.2 Contribution Type
Each safeguard element requires a set of contributors and contributions. The set of
contributors for each safeguard is a subset of the global information security contributor list and
there is no restriction on the number of safeguards that any individual contributor can contribute
to (i.e. one-to-many relationship may be present among a contributor and safeguard element).
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4.2.3.3 Constraint Type
Among the set of contributor elements for each safeguard, there are zero or more
constraint interactions. Note that it is not necessarily the case a constraint type interaction will be
associated with each safeguard. The intent was to identify common types of constraint
relationships seen in practice, specifically regarding confidentiality-focused safeguards.
Table 4-2 identifies all interactions among safeguards and contributors. The data
displayed in Table 4-2 should be interpreted in the following manner:


An element in the Safeguard column depends on the corresponding safeguard elements
identified in the Dependency Interaction column.



The elements in the Contribution Interaction column contribute to the corresponding
element in the Safeguard column.



The elements in the Constraint Interaction column constrain or are constrained by one
another as indicated.
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Table 4-2 Safeguard and contributor interaction matrix
Constraint Interaction
Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
(Contributor-Safeguard)
Risk Analysis N/A
C-Pe-01: Contributes Top-level
C-Pe-02 is constrained by C-Pe-01
S-Adm-01
support
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of risk analysis
C-Pr-01: Contributes Policy for risk
analysis
Risk
S-Adm-01: Risk management requires C-Pe-01: Contributes Top-level
C-Pe-02 is constrained by C-Pe-01
Management the results of risk analysis in order to support
S-Adm-02 adequately mitigate risks to the
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
confidentiality of EPHI.
of mitigation approach
C-Pr-02: Contributes Mitigation
approach
C-Te-01: Contributes Risk tracking
Sanction
S-Adm-04: Sanction policy cannot be C-Pe-03: Contributes Implementation N/A
Policy
applied unless suspicious actions
of sanction policy
S-Adm-03 performed by individuals have been
C-Pe-04: Contributes Notification of
identified via information system
unauthorized activity
activity reviews.
C-Pe-07: Contributes Notification of
S-Adm-13: Sanction policy cannot be unauthorized activity
applied unless suspicious activities
C-Pr-03: Contributes Sanction policy
have been identified via audit data
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
captured through log-in monitoring.
artifacts
Safeguard

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
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Safeguard
Information
System
Activity
Review
S-Adm-04

Authorization
and/or
Supervision
S-Adm-05

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
S-Tec-01: Information system activity
reviews require unique user identifiers
for EPHI applications and information
systems in order to establish
accountability for information system
activity

S-Adm-09: Authorization and
supervision of the workforce requires
that individuals be authorized and
approved for access to EPHI.

Constraint Interaction
Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-05: Contributes Implementation C-Pr-04 is constrained by C-Te-03
of review policy
C-Pe-06: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pe-07: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pr-04: Contributes Policy for
review of information system
accounts
C-Te-06: Contributes Audit data
C-Te-07: Contributes Audit data
C-Te-03: Contributes Audit review
capability
C-Pe-04: Contributes Access
C-Pr-05 is constrained by C-Pe-04
approvals
and C-Pe-06
C-Pe-06: Contributes Access
approvals
C-Pr-05: Contributes Policy for
authorization of EPHI access
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts

83

Safeguard
Workforce
Clearance
Procedure
S-Adm-06

Termination
Procedures
S-Adm-07

Isolating
Health care
Clearinghouse
Function
S-Adm-08

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
S-Adm-09: Workforce clearance
requires a process for authorizing
access to EPHI.
S-Adm-07: Workforce clearance
requires a process for removing
access to EPHI.
S-Adm-10: Workforce clearance
requires an approach for
granting/terminating user access to
EPHI.
S-Adm-09: In order for the accesses
of terminated employees to be
removed, it must be known that these
accesses exist.
S-Tec-01: Unique user identifiers
support the removal of individual
accesses upon employee
termination/separation.

S-Adm-21: Requires written contract
or other documented arrangements
regarding how external agencies (e.g.
data center hosting, data backup
services) protect EPHI from
unauthorized disclosure.

Constraint Interaction
Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-03: Contributes Implementation C-Pr-05 is constrained by C-Pe-03
of workforce clearance process
C-Pr-05: Contributes Policy for
authorization of EPHI access
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts

C-Pe-03: Contributes Notification of C-Pe-06 is constrained C-Pe-03
termination
C-Pe-07: Contributes Implementation
of termination policy
C-Pe-06: Contributes Implementation
of termination policy
C-Pe-04: Contributes Notification of
termination
C-Pr-06: Contributes Policy for
termination
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation C-Pr-07 is constrained by C-Pe-02
of policy
and C-Pe-04
C-Pe-04: Contributes Implementation
of policy
C-Pr-07: Contributes Policy for
external business partners

84

Constraint Interaction
Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
(Contributor-Safeguard)
N/A
Access
C-Pe-04: Contributes
C-Pr-05 is constrained by C-Pe-04
Authorization
Approval/disapproval of access
and C-Pe-07
S-Adm-09
requests for EPHI applications
C-Pe-07: Contributes
Approval/disapproval of access
requests for EPHI applications
C-Pr-05: Contributes Policy for
access approval
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts
Access
S-Adm-09: The establishment and
C-Pe-05: Contributes Implementation C-Pr-08 is constrained by C-Pe-06
Establishment modification of user accesses requires of access policy
and
formal authorization and approvals.
C-Pe-06: Contributes Implementation
Modification
of access policy
S-Adm-10
C-Pr-08: Contributes Policy for
access establishment
C-Pr-09: Contributes Policy for
access modification
C-Pr-10: Contributes Policy for
access removal
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts
Safeguard

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
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Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)

Safeguard
Security
Reminders
S-Adm-11

N/A

Protection
from
Malicious
Software
S-Adm-12

N/A

Constraint Interaction
Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-09: Contributes Acceptance of N/A
responsibility
C-Pe-10: Contributes Acceptance of
responsibility
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of training/refresher policy
C-Pr-11: Contributes
Training/refresher policy
C-Te-04: Contributes Capability for
security reminders
C-Pe-09: Contributes Acceptance of C-Te-05 is constrained C-Pr-12
responsibility
C-Pe-10: Contributes Acceptance of
responsibility
C-Pr-12: Contributes Virus signature
update policy
C-Te-05 : Contributes Policy
regarding malicious software
protection
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Safeguard
Log-in
Monitoring
S-Adm-13

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
S-Tec-01: In order for login
monitoring to provide meaningful
data, unique identifiers must be
utilized. Otherwise, accountability
cannot be established and log-in
monitoring provides no meaningful
indicators for who has accessed EPHI
applications.

Password
S-Adm-11: Effective password
Management management requires the use of
S-Adm-14 security reminders which informs
users of the acceptable use of
passwords, password complexity
requirements, aging, etc.

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-04: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pe-05: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pe-06: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pe-07: Contributes Implementation
of review policy
C-Pr-04: Contributes Account review
policy
C-Te-03: Contributes Audit data
C-Te-06: Contributes Audit data
C-Te-07: Contributes Audit review
capability
C-Pr-13: Contributes Password
policies
C-Te-06: Contributes Password
settings
C-Te-07: Contributes Password
settings
C-Pe-05: Contributes Implementation
of password policy
C-Pe-06: Contributes Implementation
of password policy
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
C-Pr-04 is constrained by C-Pe-04,
C-Pe-05, C-Pe-06, and C-Pe-07

C-Pr-13 is constrained by C-Pe-05
and C-Pe-06

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
Response and S-Adm-04: Response and reporting
Reporting
requires the identification of
S-Adm-15 potentially suspicious actions
regarding EPHI detected through
information system activity reviews.
S-Adm-13: Response and reporting
requires the results of log-in
monitoring to identify reportable
incidents such as unauthorized
attempts to access EPHI.
S-Adm-12: Response and reporting
requires the results of
antivirus/antispyware scans (i.e.
malicious software protection) to
identify reportable incidents.
Data Backup S-Adm-20: Data backup plan requires
Plan
criticality ranking of applications to
S-Adm-16 determine application and data backup
schedule.
Safeguard

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pr-14: Contributes Incident
response policy
C-Pe-09: Contributes Notification of
incident
C-Pe-10: Contributes Notification of
incident
C-Pe-05: Contributes Reporting of
incidents
C-Pe-06: Contributes Reporting of
incidents

C-Pe-13: Contributes Implementation
of data backup plan
C-Pr-22: Contributes Backup and
storage policy
C-Te-08: Contributes Backup
capability
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
C-Pr-14 is constrained by C-Pe-05
and C-Pe-06

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
Disaster
S-Adm-16: Requires a data backup
Recovery Plan plan – if data is not backed up, it
S-Adm-17 cannot be restored during a disaster
recovery scenario.
S-Adm-20: Requires a list of critical
applications for prioritization of EPHI
application/data recovery during a
disaster recovery scenario.
S-Adm-19: Requires incorporation of
testing and revision results in order to
address deficiencies identified during
testing.
S-Phy-01: Requires procedures and
controls for access to EPHI during the
execution of emergency operations.
Emergency S-Adm-19: Requires incorporation of
Mode
testing and revision results in order to
Operation
address deficiencies identified during
Plan
testing.
S-Adm-18 S-Adm-16: Requires a data backup
plan – if data is not backed up, it
cannot be restored during an
emergency mode/business continuity
scenario.
S-Phy-01: Requires procedures and
controls for access to EPHI during the
execution of the emergency
operations mode (business continuity)
plan
Safeguard

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-13: Contributes Disaster
recovery plan input
C-Pe-11: Contributes Disaster
recovery plan input
C-Pe-02: Contributes Disaster
recovery plan input

C-Pe-13: Contributes EMO plan
input
C-Pe-11: Contributes EMO plan
input
C-Pe-05: Contributes EMO plan
input
C-Pe-06: Contributes EMO plan
input
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)

Safeguard
Testing and
Revision
Procedure
S-Adm-19

N/A

Applications
and Data
Criticality
Analysis
S-Adm-20

N/A

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-13: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pe-11: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pe-02: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pe-05: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pe-06: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pr-15: Contributes Execution of
plan testing and revision
C-Pe-04: Contributes Ranking of data
(process implementation)
C-Pe-02: Contributes Ranking of
application (process implementation)
C-Pr-16: Contributes Data and
application criticality ranking policy
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
Written
S-Adm-16: Written contracts or other
Contract or formal documented arrangements
Other
establish the expected level of service
Arrangement from external agencies regarding how
S-Adm-21 they backup EPHI applications.
S-Adm-17: Written contracts or other
formal documented arrangements
establish the expected level of service
from external agencies regarding how
they recover EPHI applications in a
disaster recovery scenario.
S-Adm-18: Written contracts or other
formal documented arrangements
establish the expected level of service
from external agencies regarding how
they protect EPHI during an
emergency mode/business continuity
scenario.
S-Adm-19: Written contracts or other
formal documented arrangements
establish the expected level of service
from external agencies regarding how
they test associated plans
Safeguard

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of policy
C-Pe-08: Contributes Service level
agreements
C-Pr-07: Contributes Policy for
external business partners
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)

Safeguard
Contingency
Operations
S-Phy-01

N/A

Facility
S-Adm-01: Requires that risks to the
Security Plan physical location of the facility and
S-Phy-02
the facility itself be determined and
addressed in the plan.
S-Phy-04: Requires maintenance
records associated with host facility
(where EPHI is
stored/transmitted/processed) and
associated physical inventory.
S-Phy-01: Requires procedures and
controls for access to EPHI during the
execution of the execution of
contingency operations.

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-11: Contributes Implementation
of contingency operations
C-Pe-12: Contributes Implementation
of contingency operations
C-Pe-13: Contributes Implementation
of contingency operations
C-Pe-01: Contributes Implementation
of contingency operations
C-Pe-11: Contributes Facility
security plan input
C-Pe-12: Contributes Facility
security plan input
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)

Safeguard
Access
Control and
Validation
Procedures
S-Phy-03

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
S-Adm-10: The establishment and
modification of user accesses provides
the approach for establishing and
modifying physical access to locations
where EPHI is stored, transmitted,
and received.
S-Adm-09: Physical access control
and validation of physical access
requires that an individual’s access to
areas where EPHI is stored,
maintained, or transmitted be
authorized, or formally approved and
documented.

Maintenance N/A
Records
S-Phy-04

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-12: Contributes Implementation
of access control and validation
policy
C-Pr-17: Contributes Policy for
physical access validation
C-Te-02: Contributes Authorization
artifacts

C-Pe-11: Contributes Implementation
of maintenance policy
C-Pe-12: Contributes Implementation
of maintenance policy
C-Te-09: Contributes Property
tracking artifacts
C-Pr-18: Contributes Maintenance
policy
C-Pr-19: Contributes Policy for
facilities maintenance
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)

Safeguard

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
N/A
Disposal
C-Pe-11: Contributes Implementation
S-Phy-05
of policy
C-Pe-12: Contributes Implementation
of policy
C-Pr-19: Contributes Policy for
disposal and sanitization
C-Te-09: Contributes Property
tracking artifacts
C-Te-10: Contributes Disposal and
sanitization capability
Media Re-use S-Phy-05: Requires a means for
C-Pr-19: Contributes Disposal and
S-Phy-06
disposing or sanitizing media of EPHI sanitization policy
prior to issuance for re-use.
C-Pe-05: Contributes Implementation
of media-reuse policy
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of media-reuse policy
C-Te-09: Contributes Property
tracking artifacts
C-Te-10: Contributes Disposal and
sanitization capability
Accountability S-Phy-05: Accountability for
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
S-Phy-07
hardware and software requires an
of accountability policy
approach for disposal (which includes C-Pe-11: Contributes Implementation
the identification of
of accountability policy
hardware/software maintained by the C-Te-09: Contributes Property
organization).
tracking artifacts
C-Pr-23: Contributes Policy for
accountability
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
C-Pr-19 is constrained by C-Pe-11
and C-Pe-12

C-Pr-19 is constrained by C-Pe-05
and C-Pe-02

C-Pr-23 is constrained by C-Pe-11

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)
Data Backup S-Adm-16: Requires a backup
and Storage approach (schedule/frequency/etc.)
S-Phy-08
for EPHI data and applications.
Safeguard

Unique User N/A
Identification
S-Tec-01

Emergency
Access
Procedure
S-Tec-02
Automatic
Logoff
S-Tec-03

N/A

N/A

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
C-Pe-13: Contributes Implementation
of backup and storage policy
C-Pr-22: Contributes Backup and
storage policy
C-Te-08: Contributes Backup and
storage
C-Pr-20: Contributes Identification
and authentication policy
C-Te-06: Contributes Authenticator
management capability
C-Te-07: Contributes Authenticator
management capability
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of identification and authentication
policy
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of emergency access policy
C-Pr-21: Contributes Emergency
access policy
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
of log-off capability
C-Te-06: Contributes Automatic logoff capability
C-Te-07: Contributes Automatic logoff capability
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Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
N/A

C-Pr-20 is constrained by C-Te-06
and C-Te-07

N/A

C-Pe-02 is constrained by C-Te-06
and C-Te-07

Safeguard

Dependency Interaction
(Safeguard-Safeguard)

Contribution Interaction
(Contributor-Safeguard)
Encryption N/A
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
and
of encryption/decryption capability
Decryption
C-Te-06: Contributes Data
S-Tec-04
encryption capability
C-Te-07: Contributes Data
encryption capability
Mechanism to S-Tec-06: Requires that controls be in C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
Authenticate place for authenticating EPHI data
of authentication mechanisms for
Electronic
(i.e. determining that it has not been
EPHI
Protected
altered or destroyed in an
C-Te-06: Contributes Encryption
Health
unauthorized manner).
capability
Information
C-Te-07: Contributes Encryption
S-Tec-05
capability
Integrity
S-Tec-07: An approach for protecting C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
Controls
EPHI from unauthorized modification of integrity capability
S-Tec-06
during transmission requires the use
C-Te-06: Contributes Data integrity
of encryption mechanisms.
C-Te-07: Contributes Data integrity
S-Tec-04: An approach for protecting
EPHI from unauthorized modification
during transmission requires the use
of encryption and decryption
mechanisms.
Encryption N/A
C-Pe-02: Contributes Implementation
S-Tec-07
of encryption capability
C-Te-06: Contributes Data
encryption
C-Te-07: Contributes Data
encryption

96

Constraint Interaction
(Contributor-Contributor)
N/A

C-Pe-02 is constrained by C-Te-06
and C-Te-07

N/A

C-Pe-02 is constrained by C-Te-06
and C-Te-07

4.3

ISM Structure Model

In this section, the domain data presented in the previous section is modeled using
SysML block definition and parametric diagrams. This collection of diagrams represents the ISM
structure model.
4.3.1 Block Definition Diagrams
Block definition diagrams are the primary SysML structural diagram type and are used
for defining the properties and relationships of blocks. This section provides a brief description
of blocks and properties, and presents the block definition diagrams of the ISM.
4.3.1.1 Blocks
Blocks are the fundamental structural elements used in SysML modeling. They provide a
general-purpose modeling capability that can be used to represent a diverse range of real-world
objects and concepts. Blocks are characterized in terms of their properties, which further define
their features and relationships with other blocks. Value properties, part properties, and
constraint properties are of primary interest in constructing the ISM as they are essential for
generating a structure model that can be instantiated and solved using ParaSolver. Each property
type and its role in the ISM are briefly described below.
4.3.1.1.1 Value properties
Value properties represent quantitative characteristics that describe a block. In the ISM,
value properties are used to define values used in the quantification of interactions among
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contributors and safeguards (e.g. contribution and dependency scores) and in the measure of
confidentiality within the ISS. All value properties defined in the ISM are of the type “Real”,
indicating they are represented by a real number.
4.3.1.1.2 Part Properties
Part properties indicate a composite relationship among blocks and are defined using
associations. In the ISM, the composition association is used, as it implies a whole-part
relationship among the connected blocks, indicating the existence of any hierarchical level is
predicated on that of its parent.
4.3.1.1.3 Constraint Properties
Constraint properties indicate the existence of a constraint on the value properties of a
block. Constraint properties are themselves defined using constraint blocks, a special type of
SysML block which contains equations that relate the value properties of one or more blocks.
Like part properties, constraint properties are defined for a block using the composition
association between the owning block and the constraint block. In the ISM, constraint properties
are the primary mechanism for modeling the quantitative relationships that characterize systemic
interactions and the calculation of confidentiality.
4.3.1.2 ISM Block Definition Diagrams
As discussed in Section 3.4.3, the ISS consists of a hierarchy of systems, subsystems, and
elements which reside within the containing organizational system. Figure 4-2 provides a block
definition diagram that defines the top three levels of the hierarchy.
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bdd [Package] ISM BDD
«block»
Organization
parts
healthcare : InformationSecuritySystem

1
healthcare
«block»
InformationSecuritySystem
values
p1 : Real
wv : Real [1..*]
parts
hipaa : SafeguardSubsystem
hipaacontribs : ContributorSubsystem

1

1

hipaacontribs

hipaa

«block»

«block»

ContributorSubsystem

SafeguardSubsystem

Figure 4-2 ISM block definition diagram

In Figure 4-2, the systemic hierarchy of blocks is defined using the composition
association implying a whole-part relationship among the organization, system, and subsystem
levels. This results in part properties for the organization and information security system blocks
(shown in the “parts” compartment of the respective block). For example, the information
security system is composed of safeguard and contributor subsystems which are defined by the
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part properties hipaa and hipaacontribs, respectively. Additionally, the multiplicity of each
association is strictly set to 1, indicating that only one information security system, consisting of
only one safeguard subsystem and only one contributor subsystem, exists within an organization.
Also illustrated in Figure 4-2 are the block value properties that are necessary for
developing parametric diagrams and instantiating the ISM. The information security system
block contains two value properties (shown in the “values” block compartment), one which
represents the overall measure of confidentiality (p1) and one which represents the safeguard
confidentiality weights (wv). Note that the latter is defined as an aggregate value property as
indicated by its multiplicity of [1…*]. An aggregate value property is similar to array of real
numbers and in this case is advantageous as it eliminates the need for 36 additional value
properties necessary for individually representing each safeguard confidentiality weight in the
model.
Not shown in Figure 4-2 (for readability purposes) is the lowest level of the systemic
hierarchy consisting of the safeguard and contributor elements that compose the safeguard and
contributor subsystems, respectively. Two additional block definition diagrams were created to
capture each subsystem and their associations with the elements of which they are composed.
Figure 4-3 and Figure 4-4 provide block definition diagrams for the safeguard and contributor
subsystems, respectively.
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bdd [Package] Safeguard Subsystem BDD
«block»

1

SafeguardSubsystem

1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

sadm14 sadm16
sadm13 sadm15
1

1

1

1

1

1

sadm18

1

sadm20

sadm17 sadm19
1

1

1

1

1

«block»
SafeguardElement

1

sadm09 1
1

sadm08

1

1
1

sphy04

1 sphy05
1

sphy06
1 sphy07

x : Real

1

values

sphy08

1 stec01

1

1

sadm05 1

stec02

1 stec03

1

sadm04

sphy03

sphy02

cs : Real

sadm07 1
sadm06

1

1

1

1

sadm11 1
sadm10

1

1

sphy01

sadm21

1
sadm12

1

1

sadm03 1
sadm02
1

stec04

1 stec05
1

sadm01

stec06
stec07

Figure 4-3 Safeguard subsystem block definition diagram

Figure 4-3 indicates two value properties for a safeguard element, one which represents
its contribution score (cs) and one which represents its dependency score (x). The composition
association was used to define 36 individual part properties for the safeguard subsystem, each
representing a safeguard element and named according to the nomenclature scheme developed in
Section 4.2. In SysML, it is possible to define a composite or aggregate part property which, in
this case, would indicate that a safeguard subsystem may contain an arbitrary number of
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safeguard elements (for example, a single aggregate part property element with a multiplicity of
1…* could be defined using an association between the safeguard subsystem and safeguard
element blocks) . This is not appropriate for the ISM as the safeguard elements are not arbitrary
parts, but will indeed be defined in terms of their own interactions. Explicitly defining each
safeguard element using unique part properties is also necessary for instantiation.

bdd [Package] Contributor Subsystem BDD
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

«block»
ContributorSubsystem

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1
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1

1

1

1
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1

1

1

1

1 1

1 1
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1

1

1

1

cpr03cpr05 cpr07 cpr09 cpr11 cpr13 cpr15 cpr17
cpr04 cpr06 cpr08 cpr10 cpr12 cpr14 cpr16 cpr18

cpr02
1

1 1

1

1

1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
cpr01 1
cpe13
cpe12
cpe11

cpe09
cpe08
cpe07
cpe06
cpe05

1

ContributorElement

1

1
1
1

cpe10

«block»

cpr19
cpr20

1
values
cti : Real [1..*]

1

cpr21
cpr22

1

ctr : Real [1..*]

1

1

1

1
1

1

cpr23
cte01
cte02
cte03
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1

1

1
1

cte04
cte05

1

cpe04
cpe03

1
1

1

cpe02

1
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cte06
cte07
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cte08
cte09
cte10

cpe01

Figure 4-4 Contributor subsystem block definition diagram
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Figure 4-4 provides a block definition diagram of the contributor subsystem and its
associations with the contributor element block. 46 part properties were defined for the
contributor system consistent with the 46 individual contributors identified in Table 4-1. Two
aggregate value properties were defined for the contributor element block. Because any
contributor can interact with (i.e. contribute to) more than one safeguard element, it was
necessary to use an aggregate value property for the contribution value (ctr). The aggregate value
property in this case holds the indexed ctr values corresponding to the safeguards with which it
interacts. Similarly because a contributor can participate in more than one constraint-type
interaction, an aggregate value property was required for the augmented contribution score (cti).
4.3.1.3 Interactions
The three types of systemic interactions identified in Table 3-2 were modeled using three
general types of constraints blocks that are associated with the system or subsystem in which the
interaction occurs. This was accomplished using composition associations, creating constraint
properties for each owning block. Each constraint type and it’s representation within the ISM is
discussed in the following subsections. Note: SysML refers to constraint block equations as
constraints as they are viewed as mechanisms for constraining the values of system properties in
support of analysis efforts. This point is made to avoid confusion, as in this study a “constrainttype” interaction has been defined as a contributor subsystem-level interaction between one or
more contributor elements
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4.3.1.3.1 ISS (Contribution-Type) Constraint Blocks
The purpose of a contribution-type constraint block is to define the contribution score
(cs) calculation shown in equation 3.1 for each safeguard. As previously discussed, the
underlying measurement theory necessitates the use of aggregate value properties for ctr and cti.
Because of this structure, and the manner in which indexed values from aggregate value
properties are used, a unique contribution-type constraint block was required for each safeguard
due to the nature of the one-to-many relationship between contributor and safeguard elements.
Figure 4-5 provides a block definition diagram of the ISS-level contribution-type constraint
blocks, with two constrain blocks magnified to illustrate the form of the contained equations.
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Figure 4-5 ISS system-level interactions block definition diagram
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1
ct07

The information security system block owns 36 contribution-type constraint blocks which
corresponds to 36 unique constraint properties. The manner in which value properties are
connected to the parameters defined in each constraint block equation, a concept referred to as
binding, will be further detailed in Section 4.3.2 as part of the discussion of ISM parametric
diagrams.
4.3.1.3.2 Safeguard Subsystem (Dependency-Type) Constraint Blocks
The purpose of dependency-type constraint blocks is to define the dependency score
calculation shown in equation 3.2 for each safeguard element. Unlike the case of contributiontype constraint blocks, unique dependency-type constraint blocks are not necessary for each
safeguard element because aggregate value properties are not used in the equations for
calculating x (i.e. varying index values do not need to be accounted for). 5 generic constraint
blocks were defined for the cases of k0, k1, k2, k3, and k4 constraints, where k indicates the
number of dependencies for a given safeguard.
Using the composition association, each block is appropriately re-used in order to create
the necessary 36 constraint properties for the safeguard subsystem. Note that for cases in which a
safeguard has no dependencies, the corresponding k0 constraint is an equality relationship
between the dependency and contribution scores. Figure 4-6 provides a block definition diagram
that shows the dependency-type constraint blocks owned by the safeguard subsystem.
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Figure 4-6 Safeguard subsystem interactions block definition diagram

4.3.1.3.3 Contributor Subsystem (Constraint-Type) Constraint Blocks
Constraint-type constraint blocks are used for defining the relationship shown in equation
3.3 for each corresponding safeguard. Similar to the contribution-type constraint blocks, unique
constraint blocks were required for capturing contributor-contributor interactions due to the use
of aggregate value properties for ctr and cti. As shown in Figure 4-7, 20 constraint blocks were
defined resulting in 20 unique constraint properties for the contributor subsystem.
.
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Figure 4-7 Contributor subsystem interactions block definition diagram

4.3.1.3.4 Confidentiality (p1) Calculation Constraint Block
In order to define a calculation for p1 within the ISS, a p1Calc constraint block was
defined for equation 3.4. This block is typed by the ISS, giving it a constraint property for the
overall system-level measure of confidentiality. Because of the nature of equation 3.4, it is
possible that attempts to solve this equation could result in a divide by zero error should all of the
safeguard weights be set to 0 during instantiation. Because it is expected that the case of zero
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weight safeguards would not produce a measure for p1, an additional logical check was added to
the p1Calc constraint block to prevent this boundary-condition error during instantiation. Figure
4-8 illustrates the p1Calc constraint block and the corresponding equation for overall ISS
confidentiality.
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Figure 4-8 Confidentiality view block definition diagram

4.3.2 Parametric Diagrams
Parametric diagrams are used for further defining constraint properties through the
binding of block value properties to equation parameters defined in the corresponding constraint
blocks. This process provides a mechanism for relating value properties across an entire system
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subject to a set of constraints, and therefore provides the ability to analyze quantitative systemic
characteristics. With respect to the ISM, the collection of parametric diagrams details the
network of calculations used for measuring confidentiality as an emergent information security
system property.
Each block in the ISM with constraint properties, specifically as discussed in Section
4.3.1.3, has a corresponding set of parametric diagrams. The parametric diagrams for each block
are described in the following subsections. Due to the size of the parametric diagrams, excerpts
are provided in the relevant subsections below. The intent is to provide diagram portions for
facilitating the discussion of each type of parametric diagram used in the ISM, while maintaining
readability of the document. All ISM diagrams in their entirety are provided for reference in
Appendix A.
4.3.2.1 Information Security System Parametric Diagrams
The information security system block owns 6 parametric diagrams for calculating the
contribution scores of safeguards. The rationale for 6 individual diagrams was for manageability
– SysML does not require that all of a block’s constraint properties and associated bindings
appear on a single parametric diagram. Figure 4-9 provides an excerpt of an ISS contribution
parametric diagram which depicts the binding of values among two safeguards, two information
security system contribution constraint properties, and the 5 associated contributor elements.
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par [block] ContributionPar1
part hipaa
sadm02 : SafeguardElement

sadm01 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

cs : Real

sadm02cs

sadm01cs

a

a

ca01 : a01ContributionCalc

ca02 : a02ContributionCalc

constraints
{a=(b[0]+c[0]+d[0])/3}
b

constraints
{a=(b[1]+c[1]+d[0]+e[0])/4}

c

d

b

c

d

e

part hipaacontribs
cpr01 : ContributorElement

cpr0101

cpr02 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr0201

cpe01 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte01 : ContributorElement

cti : Real
ctr : Real
ctr : Real

cte0101
cpe0102

cpe0101
cpe02 : ContributorElement
cpe0201

cti : Real
cpe0202
ctr : Real

Figure 4-9 Excerpt of ISS level contribution parametric diagram

As shown in Figure 4-9, the hipaa and hipaacontribs part properties of the information
security system are represented by frames, which contain the respective safeguard and
contributor elements. Additionally, the value properties of these elements are exposed, and the
binding to each equation parameter is visible.
The information security system owns one additional parametric diagram for calculating
confidentiality. A portion of the confidentiality parametric diagram is shown in Figure 4-10.
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par [block] InformationSecuritySystem

part hipaa

sadm01 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
c

sadm02 : SafeguardElement

x : Real

pc : p1Calculation

d

constraints
{a=if(sum(b)>0,(b[0]*c+b[1]*d+b[22]*e+b[23]*f+b[24]*g+b[25]*h+b[26]*i+b[27]*j+b[32]*k+b[34]*l-

a

+b[33]*m+b[35]*n+b[13]*o+b[10-

p1 : Real

]*p+b[7]*q+b[20]*r+b[18]*s+b[16sphy01 : SafeguardElement

]*t+b[15]*u+b[19]*v+b[28]*w+b[17]*x+b[2]*y+b[3]*z+b[12]*aa+b[4]*bb+b[5]*cc+b[9]*dd+b[8]*ee-

x : Real

+b[6]*ff+b[29]*gg+b[14]*hh+b[1e 1]*ii+b[23]*jj+b[30]*kk+b[31]*ll)/sum(b),0)}

sphy02 : SafeguardElement

x : Real

b

f

wv : Real

Figure 4-10 Portion of confidentiality parametric diagram

Note that the constraint equation indicates the terms for 36 safeguard elements, although
only four safeguards are shown (for diagram readability). Additionally, the value properties for
p1 and wv do not appear in a frame as they are not defined by a part property, but belong to the
owning block (i.e. the information security system) itself.
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4.3.2.2 Safeguard Subsystem Parametrics Diagrams
The safeguard subsystem owns three parametric diagrams for calculating the dependency
scores for each safeguard element. Like contribution parametric diagrams, multiple dependency
parametric diagrams were used as opposed to a single and large diagram. Figure 4-11 provides a
sample safeguard subsystem dependency parametric diagram.

par [block] DependencyPar1

sadm02 : SafeguardElement

sadm01 : SafeguardElement
a

x : Real

sadm02ds

a02d : k1DependencyCalc
constraints
{a=min(b,((b+c)/2))}

x : Real

constraints

a02d1
c

cs : Real

sadm02csd

a
a01d : k0DependencyCalc

sadm01ds

{a=b}

cs : Real

b

b

sadm01csd
p02d1

sphy02 : SafeguardElement

sphy01 : SafeguardElement
c
cs : Real

p02d3

a

p02d : k3DependencyCalc

x : Real

sphy02ds

d

constraints
{a=min(b,((b+c+d+e)/4))}

sphy01csd
x : Real

cs : Real
e

sphy01ds

b

sphy02csd

p02d2

sphy04 : SafeguardElement
b

sphy04csd

a

b
p04d :

p01d : k0DependencyCalc

cs : Real

k0DependencyCalc

constraints

constraints

{a=b}
x : Real

sphy04ds

{a=b}
a

Figure 4-11 Excerpt of safeguard subsystem parametric diagram

The dependency parametric diagram shown in Figure 4-11 illustrates the calculation of
safeguard dependency scores as defined in equation 3.2 using the cs values for dependent
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safeguards. Figure 4-11 also shows the case of k0 constraints, in which the cs and x values for a
safeguard are equivalent.
4.3.2.3 Contributor Subsystem Parametric Diagrams
The contributor subsystem contains one constraint parametric diagram which captures all
of the corresponding constraint properties. Figure 4-12 provides an excerpt of the contributor
subsystem parametric diagram which depicts the contributor-contributor interactions for
safeguard sadm013 (identified in the constraint property as “a13q: a13ConstraintCalc”), in which
the cpr04 contributor element is constrained by contributor elements cpe04, cpe05, cpe06, and
cpe07.

par [block] ContributorSubsystem
cpr04 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

ctr : Real

c
a

b
f

a13q : a13ConstraintCalc

constraints
{c[1]=if(a[5]<b[1] || d[2]<b[1] || e[4]<b[1] ||
f[3]<b[1],min(a[5],d[2],e[4],f[3]),b[1])}
d

cpe04 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

e

cpe05 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

Figure 4-12 Excerpt of contributor subsystem constraint parametric diagram
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The constraint property shown in Figure 4-12 illustrates that a more-complex logical
statement was required for determining the cti value for a contributor according to equation 3.3.
This results from the nature of the constraint which is based on a comparison of values as
opposed to strictly a calculation.

4.4

ISM Instance Model

The instance model defines a specific instance of the ISM structure model using an object
diagram. The object diagram contains instances of the blocks defined in the structure model and
enforces all of the structural properties (value, part, and constraint) defined in the structure
model. Each instance contains slots which correspond to its properties. Of specific interest are
the slots which represent value properties, which will contain user-defined input variables, in
addition to all values calculated via parametric solving. Table 4-3 identifies the structure model
block and the corresponding number of instances specified in the instance model.

Table 4-3 Object diagram instances and quantity
Structure Model Block
Organization
Information Security System
Safeguard Subsystem
Contributor Subsystem
Safeguard Element
Contributor Element
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Instance Count
1
1
1
1
36
46

The details of populating slot values and solving are deferred to Chapter 5 as the intent of
this section is to introduce the ISM object diagram and relevant instance model concepts. The
ISM contains a single object diagram which holds all instances. A portion of the ISM object
diagram is shown in Figure 4-13.

Organization01 : Organization
healthcare = InformationSecuritySystem01

healthcare
InformationSecuritySystem01 :
InformationSecuritySystem
hipaacontribs = ContributorSubsystem01
hipaacontribs

hipaa

hipaa = SafeguardSubsystem01
p1 : Real = 0.0
wv : Real = 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, ...
ca01

cpe0101 :

ContributorSubsystem01 :

SafeguardSubsystem01 :

ContributorSubsystem

SafeguardSubsystem

stec0101 :

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement
cpe01

stec01

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

cs : Real

cti : Real

x : Real

cpe0201 :

stec0201 :

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

stec02

cpe02

cs : Real

cti : Real

x : Real

cpe0301 :

stec0301 :

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement
stec03

cpe03
ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

cs : Real

cti : Real

x : Real

Figure 4-13 Excerpt of ISM instance model object diagram with slots shown
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4.5

Summary

In this chapter, an ISM was developed for implementing the measurement approach
developed in Chapter 3. A system model capable of being instantiated was constructed using
SysML. In the next chapter the ISM instantiation process is described, and several experiments
are performed to demonstrate the ability of the ISM to generate a measure of confidentiality.
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CHAPTER 5
ISM INSTANTIATION AND RESULTS
5.1

Introduction

In this chapter, the ISM developed in Chapter 4 is instantiated for the purpose of
generating a measure of confidentiality. This was accomplished by populating the ISM instance
model with user input values and solving using ParaSolver. The primary objective was to
demonstrate the ability of the ISM to be instantiated using a set of initial input values. Several
verification tests were performed to confirm that the ISM accurately represented the conceptual
measurement approach defined in Chapter 3. Additionally, a set of experiments was performed
to assess changes in the measure of confidentiality by varying the minimum and maximum
contribution input values for each type of contributor. The illustration shown in Figure 5-1
provides an overview of the ISM instantiation process.




Weights for confidentiality safeguards
Contribution values for contributor
elements

ISM Instance
Model



Populated
Instance model

Instantiated
ISM



Confidentiality measure

User-provided
Data

Figure 5-1 ISM instantiation overview
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5.2

Description of Experiments

As previously stated, the primary objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the ability of
the ISM to be instantiated therefore demonstrating the capability of the overall measurement
approach to generate a measure of confidentiality. In this section, several tests and experiments
consisting of one or more instantiations are described for meeting this objective.
5.2.1 Model Verification Tests
Three verification tests were performed to determine if the conceptual measurement steps
developed in Section 3.5 were implemented correctly (i.e. as intended) in the ISM. These tests
are described below.
5.2.1.1 1’s Ctr Test
An instantiation using a value of 1.00 for the ctr slot value for each contributor instance
was performed. The objective of this test is to verify the upper bound on p1, specifically the
maximum value of confidentiality that can exist in the ISS if all contributors are contributing
their maximum value. A weight value of 1.00 for all safeguards was assumed. The value of p1
returned by ParaSolver after solving the instance should be 1.00.
5.2.1.2 0’s Ctr Test
An instantiation using a value of 0.00 for the ctr slot value for each contributor instance
was performed. The objective of this test is to verify the lower bound on p1, specifically the
minimum value of confidentiality that can exist in the ISS if all contributors are contributing
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their minimum value. A weight value of 1.00 for all safeguards was assumed. The value of p1
returned by ParaSolver after solving the instance should be 0.00.
5.2.1.3 ParaSolver Browser Test
Although not based on specific instance model input values, the ParaSolver browser itself
performs a validation of the SysML structure model prior to loading. This is similar to a
compile-time check and indicates the existence of diagramming errors (e.g. missing connectors).
Additionally, the browser check will identify certain instance model errors, such as uninitialized
parameters or unpopulated slots for which values are required. Because in all cases the
ParaSolver browser must load prior to solving, each instantiation can be viewed as being
structurally validated with respect to ParaSolver.
5.2.2 Boundary Experiments
Six additional experiments (instantiations) were performed to assess the change in the
value of p1 predicated by varying the contribution input values for each type of contributor. This
experiment consisted of 6 individual instantiations in which the ctr values for combinations of
contributor types were set to their minimum (ctr = 0.00) and maximum (ctr = 1.00). A weight
value of 1.00 for all safeguards was assumed, indicating an equal importance of each HIPAA
Security Rule safeguard in the calculation of p1. Table 5-1 illustrates the combinations of ctr
values and contributor types utilized in the experiments.
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Table 5-1 Boundary experiment table
Contributor
Type
People
Process
Technology

Experiment
1
ctr value

2
ctr value

3
ctr value

4
ctr value

5
ctr value

6
ctr value

1.00
1.00
0.00

1.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.00
1.00

0.00
1.00
0.00

0.00
0.00
1.00

0.00
1.00
1.00

5.3

Model Inputs and ParaSolver Setup

5.3.1 Instance Model Inputs
ParaSolver provides an interface with Microsoft Excel, which can be used to import
spreadsheets containing input values into the ISM instance model within Artisan Studio. Setting
up the interface involved linking the ctr and wv slot values in the instance model to the
corresponding rows/columns in the spreadsheet containing input values. The initial setup is only
performed once and subsequent instantiations can be performed by modifying the input values in
the spreadsheet, and re-importing into the instance model. The Excel interface was particularly
advantageous for managing the values associated with the ctr and wv aggregate value properties.
An ISM Data.xlsx spreadsheet was created for holding instance model input and output
values (model output is further discussed in Section 5.4). Instance model inputs are contained in
the “ctr input matrix” tab. Additionally the spreadsheet contains a “ctr verification matrix” tab,
which documents the mapping of each contributor slot to the corresponding safeguard. Figure
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5-2 provides a screen capture of the ISM Data.xls spreadsheet, with the ctr input matrix tab
shown.

Figure 5-2 ISM Data.xlsx spreadsheet

5.3.2 Browser Initialization
Once the Excel interface has been executed for a set of input values, the structure and
instance model headings are created, and the ParaSolver browser is launched. Headings are used
to define the root block in the structure model, in this case the Organization block, and to version
the instance model be solved. These headings are referred to as CXS and CXI, respectively.
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When the ParaSolver browser is launched, the structure and instance model data is parsed
into the appropriate data structures for solving using the external Mathematica solver. As
mentioned earlier, when the browser is successfully launched, the indication is that the integrity
of the structure model has been successfully validated. Figure 5-3 shows the ParaSolver browser
following a successful launch within the Artisan Studio modeling environment.

Figure 5-3 ParaSolver browser following successful launch
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5.3.3 Variables and Causality
Prior to solving, a causality state must be assigned to each variable (i.e. value property)
used in solving for p1. Causality refers to the relationship among variables within parametric
equations. ParaSolver requires that one of four causality states be assigned to each variable prior
to solving. These states are:
1) Given: known value provided by the user before solving.
2) Target: unknown value of which the user desires to calculate.
3) Undefined: unknown value which may be calculated in solving for the target.
4) Ancillary: unknown value prior to solving - calculated during solving and used to
calculate the value of another variable.
Once the ParaSolver browser loads, all variables are initially set to the undefined
causality state. It is only necessary to change the causality of p1 to target. All ctr and wv values
are automatically set to a given state based on being imported via the Excel interface. All
remaining variables remain undefined. Table 5-2 provides a summary of each variable and
identifies the initial and final causality states for each.
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Table 5-2 Variable definition, multiplicity, and causality assignment
Initial
Final
Causality Causality

Variable Multiplicity Description

p1

1

wv

1…*

ctr

1…*

cti

1…*

cs

1

x

1

Value property owned by the ISS
block. Calculated using parametric
equations (i.e. interactions) defined
with the ISS, safeguard, and
contributor subsystems. Represents
the measure of confidentiality.
Aggregate value property owned by
the ISS block. Contains 36 real values
and represents a vector of safeguard
weights.
Aggregate value property owned by a
contributor block. Contains one or
more contribution values for each
safeguard to which it contributes.
Aggregate value property owned by a
contributor block. Contains modified
ctr values for each safeguard (i.e. ctr
value affected by a contributorcontributor interaction within the
contributor subsystem).
Value property owned by a safeguard
block. Represents the contribution
score and is used in the calculation of
x.
Value property owned by a safeguard
block. Represents the safeguard
dependency score.

5.4

Target

Target

Given

Given

Given

Given

Undefined Ancillary

Undefined Ancillary

Undefined Ancillary

Output and Analysis

ParaSolver reports solution results in the application browser within the Artisan Studio
modeling environment as shown in Figure 5-4. Additionally it provides an interface for writing
values to Excel. For each instantiation, all x values and p1 results were written back to a tab in
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the ctr matrix spreadsheet to populate the confidentiality metric (confidentiality metric tab). The
results of all instantiations discussed in this section are included in Appendix B.

Figure 5-4 ParaSolver browser following solving

5.4.1 Model Verification Results
5.4.1.1 1’s Ctr Test
The resulting solution provided by ParaSolver was a p1 value of 1.00 as expected.
125

5.4.1.2 0’s Ctr Test
The resulting solution provided by ParaSolver was a p1 value of 0.00 as expected.
5.4.2 Additional Experiments
The additional boundary experiments identified in 5.2.2 provide an indication of how
people, process, and technology contributors affect the overall measure of confidentiality in the
ISS. The results of these experiments are illustrated in Figure 5-5

001
1.000

Max ctr: technology
Min ctr: people, process

0.800
Max ctr: people, processes
Min ctr: technology

Max ctr: process
Min ctr: people, technology

0.600

110

0.659

010

0.238

0.400

0.200

0.101
p1

0.000

0.373
0.773
101
Max ctr: people, technology
Min ctr: process

011
Max ctr: process, technology
Min ctr: people

0.467

100

Max ctr: people
Min ctr: process, technology

Figure 5-5 Plot of p1 results for boundary experiments

As shown in Figure 5-5, p1 most dramatically changes when the ctr values for people and
technology contributors are at their minimum, the process ctr values are at their maximum and
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then these conditions are reversed resulting in an increase in p1 from 0.101 to 0.773. The
indication is that people and technology contributors participate together in a high number of
contribution-type interactions. Additionally, the lowest p1 value (0.101) results when only
process contributors are contributing to safeguards. The interpretation here is that that processes
alone are not sufficient for maintaining confidentiality, a concept which was first introduced in
Chapter 2.
Also of significant interest is that the three lowest p1 values (0.238, 0.101, 0.373) all
occur when the ctr values for all people contributors are 0. From the perspective of the ISM, this
indicates that there are a high number of people-type contributors that participate in contributiontype interactions. As the corresponding ctr values go to 0, the cs and x scores calculated using
these values begin to drop across the safeguard subsystem. In practice, this underscores the point
introduced in Chapter 2 that organizational information security is not just a technical matter, but
indeed people play a significant role in the protection of electronic information.
5.4.3 Confidentiality Metric
Using the Excel interface, the confidentiality metric tab of the ISM Data.xlsx spreadsheet
was populated following each model instantiation. Figure 5-6 provides an example
confidentiality metric generated using the ParaSolver output. The content of the confidentiality
metric is consistent with that described in Section 3.6.
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Safeguard
Risk Analysis
Risk Management
Sanction Policy
Information System Activity Review
Authorization and/or Supervision
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Termination Procedures
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function
Access Authorization
Access Establishment and Modification
Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious Software
Log-in Monitoring
Password Management
Response and Reporting
Data Backup Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Testing and Revision Procedure
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Maintenance Records
Disposal
Media Re-use
Accountability
Data Backup and Storage
Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Integrity Controls
Encryption

Type
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Administrative
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Physical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical
Technical

ID
S-Adm-01
S-Adm-02
S-Adm-03
S-Adm-04
S-Adm-05
S-Adm-06
S-Adm-07
S-Adm-08
S-Adm-09
S-Adm-10
S-Adm-11
S-Adm-12
S-Adm-13
S-Adm-14
S-Adm-15
S-Adm-16
S-Adm-17
S-Adm-18
S-Adm-19
S-Adm-20
S-Adm-21
S-Phy-01
S-Phy-02
S-Phy-03
S-Phy-04
S-Phy-05
S-Phy-06
S-Phy-07
S-Phy-08
S-Tec-01
S-Tec-02
S-Tec-03
S-Tec-04
S-Tec-05
S-Tec-06
S-Tec-07

Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
0.333
1.00
0.417
1.00
0.400
1.00
0.571
1.00
0.250
1.00
0.333
1.00
0.333
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.250
1.00
0.375
1.00
0.400
1.00
0.500
1.00
0.375
1.00
0.400
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.500
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.167
1.00
0.333
1.00
0.233
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.000
1.00
0.472
1.00
0.500
1.00
0.400
1.00
0.400
1.00
0.250
1.00
0.667
1.00
0.750
1.00
0.500
1.00
0.667
1.00
0.667
1.00
0.667
1.00
0.667
1.00
0.667
1.00

wx
0.333
0.417
0.400
0.571
0.250
0.333
0.333
0.000
0.250
0.375
0.400
0.500
0.375
0.400
0.000
0.500
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.333
0.233
0.000
0.000
0.472
0.500
0.400
0.400
0.250
0.667
0.750
0.500
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667

p1 value
0.373

Figure 5-6 Confidentiality metric generated using ParaSolver

5.5

Summary

In this chapter, the ISM’s ability to generate a measure of confidentiality was
demonstrated. Additionally, this served the dual purpose of demonstrating the measurement
approach developed in Chapter 3. The results obtained verify the proper implementation of the
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measurement approach and conceptual ISS and demonstrate the ability of the ISM to generate a
quantitative measure of confidentiality using a set of user-provided input values.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
6.1

Summary of Work

In this study, a new approach for measuring the confidentiality of electronic information
in health-care related organizations was formulated. Through an analysis of the existing classes
and types of general information security measurement approaches, it was determined that a
number of underlying issues are present which prevent their direct adaptation to the problem of
measuring the confidentiality of electronic information in complex organizational systems. In
order to overcome some of these issues, a systemic perspective on information security and
confidentiality was adopted. By identifying and investigating the systemic characteristics that are
present among the HIPAA Security Rule safeguards and their respective people, process, and
technology organizational contributors, an information security system (ISS) for assuring the
confidentiality of electronic information in healthcare organizations was synthesized.
Confidentiality – a desired emergent property of the ISS – was defined in terms of the systemic
interactions present in the ISS. By quantifying these interactions, a measure for the protection of
electronic information from unauthorized disclosure was developed.
The measurement approach was implemented and demonstrated using an ISM developed
in SysML. The ISM specifies an ISS and the systemic interactions among the safeguard and
contributor elements that are present using block definition diagrams. Using SysML parametric
diagrams, the quantitative interactions among the 36 HIPAA Security Rule safeguards and 46
organizational contributors were modeled. Using ParaSolver’s SysML parametric diagram
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execution capability, multiple instantiations of the ISM were performed and measures of
confidentiality were generated using user-defined input values for contribution values and
safeguard confidentiality weights. The results verify the proper implementation of the
measurement approach and conceptual ISS and demonstrate the ability of the ISM to generate a
quantitative measure of confidentiality using a set of user-provided input values.

6.2

Significance of Work

The propagation of personal medical information throughout healthcare-related
organizations facilitated by expansions in health information technology and digital patient
records has increased the difficulty associated with determining how “well” the confidentiality of
electronic information is being maintained. While information security standards define the
requirements for securing the overall information technology and processing environment of an
organization, there is a lack of standard methods for measuring the protection levels of electronic
information using these standards. The research presented in this work provides a systems-based
solution that addresses the challenges associated with measuring the protection of electronic
information within organizations that deliver healthcare services.
The measurement philosophy adopted in this research is differentiated from the existing
methods discussed in Chapter 2 in that it acknowledges the existence of a conceptual protection
system that subsists within complex organizational environments. The core approach of
synthesizing information security-relevant systems is advantageous in that information security
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is addressed in a systemic context as opposed to the more-common approach of evaluating it
with respect to individual protection mechanisms or hard systems in isolation.
The approach developed in this research offers organizations a new method for obtaining
visibility regarding the status of their information security efforts. Such insight facilitates the
ability to not only evaluate and improve their information security programs and demonstrate
compliance with requisite information security standards, but more importantly it supports the
execution of due-diligence and due-care in addressing stakeholder-specific concerns regarding
the confidentiality of personal health information. The proposed approach is also significant in
that provides the ability to perform “what-if” scenarios and assessments of change in
confidentiality that result from new safeguard standards or changes in the contribution values of
people, processes, or technology to safeguards.
Additionally, this work puts forth a generalized approach for addressing information
security measurement that is independent of a specific implementation. The general approach is
illustrated in Figure 6-1.
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Investigate
Determine the
systemic elements
and interactions
necessary for
information security
measurement

Determine the presence of
systemic characteristics
(complexity, dynamics, &
emergence) within the
environment

Synthesize

Formalize

Formally define the
structural hierarchy of a
system and quantify the
contained interactions

Figure 6-1 Measurement approach concept

6.2.1 Limitations and Assumptions
This measurement approach developed in this research assumes that the contribution
values for each contributor and the confidentiality safeguard weights can be determined. That is,
an approach for estimating these values is assumed, and is not developed in this study.
The lack of a unified approach for the large-scale validation of information security
metrics is a problem endemic to information security research. Practical and legal challenges, in
addition to organizations’ reluctance to reveal the details of their information security control
environments are some of the many roadblocks to large-scale validation of information security
metrics and measurement approaches (Greer, Hoo, and Jaquith, 2010). The lack of historical data
makes it difficult to perform macro or micro-level validation of results. This is in contrast to
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other system-level properties, such as reliability, which have the benefit of more well-established
models and analysis techniques.
However, the lack of universally-accepted validation methods should not preclude the
development of new approaches for measuring the protection levels of electronic information. As
noted by NIST (2010), most formal approaches for security measurement and assessment have
achieved only limited success. This study focused on the development of a new approach and
measurement paradigm for confidentiality and information security in an organizational context.
This study is germane to the general control environment within an organization, and does
not attempt to address each of the individual security settings and parameters that exist within the
hardware and software components present within an organization. In Chapter 3, it was
discussed that a measure of confidentiality in the context of the overarching general control
environment is a more-appropriate indicator as it addresses the function of a protection system.
The intent of this research was to provide a good, yet practical measure of information security
with respect to the general control environment.

6.3

Research Contributions

A primary contribution of this research is to the general body of knowledge regarding
information security measurement, specifically within the healthcare domain. As evidenced by
the literature review presented in Chapter 2, there is an observable lack of research regarding
information security measurement and metrics specifically within the healthcare industry. This
work provides an approach for measuring information security as it relates to the information
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security requirements and standards of healthcare-related organizations. Table 6-1 provides a
summary of the key contribution areas for this study.
Table 6-1 Summary of research contributions
Area of
Contribution
Healthcare
Information Security
Measurement
General Information
Security
Measurement

Enterprise-level
Security Metrics

Summary
This work provides an approach for measuring
information security as it relates to the HIPAA Security
Rule.
This research offers a new approach and measurement
paradigm for confidentiality and information security
measurement in general. The systemic solution proposed
in this study provides a new way forward for measuring
information security properties in terms of systemic
elements which are present in a general control
environment.
This study proposes a new metric for confidentiality that
offers more fidelity than existing metrics by addressing
the contributions from people, process, and technologies
to safeguards in a systems context.

6.4

Future Research Directions

This study focused on the development of a new approach and measurement paradigm
for information security. While the underlying theory for systemic information security
measurement was presented and demonstrated, there are several key areas of future work to be
explored. These areas are identified in the following subsections.
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6.4.1 Extensibility
Although this study focused on the concept of a protection system (i.e. an ISS), the core
concept of synthesizing information security-relevant systems can be extended to address other
systems of interest. For example, threats and vulnerabilities are important information security
concepts that will need to be addressed in future research efforts because of their effect on
organizational efforts to protect electronic information.
Using the same approach discussed in Chapter 3, "threat” and “vulnerability” systems
could be synthesized. Subsequently, their subsystems, elements, and interactions could be
formalized and added to the ISM concept. The interaction between the ISS and the
threat/vulnerability systems and elements could be investigated and the effect on confidentiality
could be assessed. Such analysis would not only be beneficial for building a complete
information security measurement approach, but would also be beneficial when new stakeholder
concerns arise regarding a specific type of threat or vulnerability. Figure 6-2 provides an
example of a hypothetical threat system in relation to an ISS as part of synthesis.

.
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Figure 6-2 Organization, ISS, and hypothetical threat system

6.4.2 Additional Studies
Because this study is relative to development of a new measurement approach, the
experiments discussed in Chapter 5 are relative to boundary conditions (i.e. min/max values for
contributor types). A primary area for additional studies would be the development of
methodology for determining (estimating) the contribution values for the various contributor
elements and performing additional experiments using these values.
As stated in Section 6.2.1, validation is a key area of need affecting information security
measurement and metrics in general. Additional studies should be performed to further validate
the systemic approach for measuring confidentiality developed in this study. Application to
information security standards and domains other than healthcare would also be beneficial for
further validation of the measurement approach.
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The integration of human behavior (e.g. social technical) models for estimating
contribution values could add a powerful predictive and forecasting capability to the approach
developed in this study. This distinction is important, as the solution proposed in this research
involves capturing what a system “is doing”, as opposed to what it “can do” over time. The
former is measurement-focused where the latter is improvement-focused.
6.4.3 Metrics Aggregation
Another direction for future research relates to applying the proposed measurement
approach to the remaining protection perspectives identified in the HIPAA Security Rule (i.e.
integrity and availability). Such work would provide a foundation for secondary studies
regarding the aggregation of information security metrics. The formal aggregation and
composition of security properties and associated metrics is a significant challenge facing the
information security research community. A consistent approach for measuring individual
security properties is a critical element related to these efforts. Figure 6-3 illustrates the scope of
this research in the context of future work related to information security metrics aggregation.
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Figure 6-3 Information security metric aggregation
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cte03 : ContributorElement

cpe0902
cpe07 : ContributorElement
cte0302

cti : Real
cpe0705
ctr : Real
ctr : Real
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ctr : Real

d

e

f

par [block] ContributionPar4

part hippa

sadm15 : SafeguardElement

sadm16 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

sadm17 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

sadm15cs

ca15 : a15ContributionCalc
c

d

e

f
b

c

b

d

sadm19cs

a

c

a

ca18 : a18ContributionCalc

ca17 : a17ContributionCalc

ca16 : a16ContributionCalc
b

cs : Real

sadm18cs

a

a

sadm19 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

sadm17cs

sadm16cs

a

sadm18 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

b

d

c

d

ca19 : a19ContributionCalc
e

b

c

d

e

part hippacontribs

cpe06 : ContributorElement
cpe0608
ctr : Real

cpe0607

cpe0609

cte08 : ContributorElement

cte0801
ctr : Real
cpe02 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr22 : ContributorElement
cpr1401

cpe0206

cpe0205
cpr2201

ctr : Real
cpe11 : ContributorElement

cpr14 : ContributorElement
cpe1101
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpe1103

cpe1102
cti : Real
cpe05 : ContributorElement
cpe0506

cpe0505
ctr : Real

cpe1302

cpe0507

cpe13 : ContributorElement
cpe1304

cpe10 : ContributorElement
cpe1301

cpe1003
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpe1303
cpr15 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe09 : ContributorElement

cpe0903

ctr : Real
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cpr1501

f

g

par [block] ContributionPar5

part hippa
sadm20 :

sphy01 :

sphy03 :

sphy05 :

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

sadm21 :

sphy02 :

sphy04 :

sphy06 :

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

cs : Real

cs : Real

a

cs : Real

cs : Real

sphy01cs

sphy05cs

sphy03cs

sadm20cs

a

a

a
sphy04cs

cp01 : p01ContributionoCalc

ca20 : a20ContributionCalc
b

c

b

d

c

d

cp03 : p03ContributionCalc

e

b

sadm21cs

c

cp05 : p05ContributionCalc

d

sphy02cs
a

c

c

d

e

sphy06cs

f

a

a
cp04 : p04ContributionCalc

ca21 : a21ContributionCalc
b

b

a

cp06 : p06ContributionCalc

cp02 : p02ContributionCalc

d

b

b

c

c

d

e

b

c

d

e

cpe0407
part hippacontribs
cpr1701

cpe1202

cpe1203
cpe12 : ContributorElement

cpr1601

cpe1204

cpe04 : ContributorElement
ctr : Real

cpe1201

cpe1205
cpr19 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr17 : ContributorElement
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpr1902
cti : Real

cpe1105

cpe0508

cpr1901
cpe11 : ContributorElement

cpr16 : ContributorElement

cpe05 : ContributorElement

cpe1106

cpe1104
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

ctr : Real
cte10 : ContributorElement

cpe1107
cpe01 : ContributorElement

cte1001
ctr : Real

cpe0207
cpe0103

cpe02 : ContributorElement
cpe0208

ctr : Real

cte1002

cpe1305
ctr : Real
cpe13 : ContributorElement

cpe0209

cte02 : ContributorElement

cte0903
cte09 : ContributorElement

cpr07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte0207

cpe08 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real
cte0902
ctr : Real

cpr1801

cpr0702
ctr : Real

cpe0801

ctr : Real
cpr18 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real
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cte0901

f

par [block] ContributionPar6
part hippa
sphy07 :

stec01 :

stec03 :

stec05 :

stec07 :

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

stec02 :

stec04 :

stec06 :

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

SafeguardElement

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

cs : Real

sphy08cs

stec04cs

stec02cs

a

a

sphy07cs

b

c

stec06cs

a

stec01cs

a
stec07cs

stec03cs

cp08 : p08ContributionCalc
a

cs : Real

sphy08 :

ct02 : s02ContributionCalc

d

b

stec05cs

ct04 : s04ContributionCalc

c

a

b

a

c

ct06 : s06ContributionCalc

d

b

c

d
a

a
cp07 : p07ContributionCalc
b

c

d

ct01 : s01ContributionCalc

ct03 : s03ContributionCalc

ct07 : s07ContributionCalc

ct05 : s05ContributionCalc

e

b

c

d

e

b

c

d

b

c

d

b

c

part hippacontribs
cpe0214
cpe02 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cpe0215

cpe0213

cpe0217
cpe0212
ctr : Real
cpe0210
cpe0216
cpe0211

cpe13 : ContributorElement

cpr2202
cpr22 : ContributorElement

cte0606

cpe1306 ctr : Real
ctr : Real

cte06 : ContributorElement
cte0607

cte0604
cpe11 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte08 : ContributorElement

cte0605

cte0608
cte0609

cpr20 : ContributorElement

cte0802
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpe1108

cte0706

ctr : Real

cte07 : ContributorElement
cpr2001

cte09 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cte0705
cte0708

cte0904

ctr : Real

cte0704

cpr23 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte0709

cpr21 : ContributorElement

cte0707

ctr : Real

ctr : Real
cti : Real
cpr2301
cpr2101
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d

par [block] DependencyPar1

sadm02 : SafeguardElement

sadm01 : SafeguardElement
sadm01ds
sadm02csd

cs : Real

b

sadm02ds

a01d :
k0DependencyCalc

a02d : k1DependencyCalc
x : Real

a

x : Real
c

a

cs : Real

a02d1

b

sadm01csd
p02d1

stec05 : SafeguardElement

x : Real

sphy01 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

sphy01csd

b

p01d :

c

cs : Real

a

sphy02 : SafeguardElement
sphy02ds

p02d : k3DependencyCalc

x : Real

p04d :
k0DependencyCalc

k0DependencyCalc
a

p02d3

d
e

x : Real

b

b

sphy02csd

a

cs : Real

sphy01ds
p02d2

sphy04 : SafeguardElement

sphy04csd

stec05csd
b

cs : Real

t07d :

t05d : k1DependencyCalc

k0DependencyCalc

stec05ds

a

a

sphy04ds

b
x : Real

c
stec07ds

t05d1
sadm14 : SafeguardElement

stec06 : SafeguardElement

stec07csd

stec07 : SafeguardElement

sphy06 : SafeguardElement

sphy05 : SafeguardElement
sphy06ds

a

x : Real

x : Real

cs : Real

x : Real

cs : Real

x : Real

cs : Real

x : Real

cs : Real
p06d1

p06d : k1DependencyCalc
c
cs : Real
sphy06csd

b
stec06csd
sphy05ds
sadm14ds

sphy05csd

sadm14csd
a

t06d1
b

c

stec04 : SafeguardElement

b
p05d :
a
k0DependencyCalc

sphy07 : SafeguardElement

t06d : k2DependencyCalc

p07d1
t06d2

c
p07d : k1DependencyCalc

b
cs : Real

x : Real

a

b

sphy07csd

sadm11 : SafeguardElement
a14d1

sadm11csd
cs : Real
sadm11ds
x : Real

sphy07ds
x : Real

cs : Real

d

c
a14d : k1DependencyCalc

a

stec04csd

b

b

a11d :

t04d :

k0DependencyCalc
a

k0DependencyCalc
a
stec04ds
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par [block] DependencyPar2

sphy03 : SafeguardElement

sadm06 : SafeguardElement
b

b

d

b

d

a09d :

cs : Real

cs : Real

a06d :

k0DependencyCalc

p03d : k2DependencyCalc

k3DependencyCalc
a

a

x : Real

c

e

a

c

x : Real

sadm09 : SafeguardElement

sadm05 : SafeguardElement
sadm10 : SafeguardElement
cs : Real

sadm10 : SafeguardElement

c

b

a05d :

cs : Real

k1DependencyCalc

b

c

cs : Real

cs : Real

a10d :

a
x : Real

k1DependencyCalc

x : Real

a

x : Real

x : Real

sadm04 : SafeguardElement

stec01 : SafeguardElement
b

cs : Real
sadm03 : SafeguardElement

a04d :

c

cs : Real

c

sadm07 : SafeguardElement

k1DependencyCalc
cs : Real

b

x : Real

a

d

x : Real

b

a03d :

x : Real

cs : Real

a07d :

k2DependencyCalc
a

k2DependencyCalc

a

x : Real

c

d
stec01 : SafeguardElement

sadm13 : SafeguardElement
c

b
cs : Real

cs : Real

a13d :
k1DependencyCalc

x : Real

x : Real

a

stec03 : SafeguardElement
a

b
t01d :

k0DependencyCalc

sadm15 : SafeguardElement

cs : Real

x : Real

sadm12 : SafeguardElement
e

d

b
cs : Real

c

cs : Real

a15d : k3DependencyCalc
x : Real

a
a12d : k0DependencyCalc

a
x : Real

Name: [block] DependencyPar2
FullScopedName: ISM::SafeguardSubsystem.[block] DependencyPar2
DynamicUmlClassName: ParametricDiagram

154

b

b

t03d :

a

k0DependencyCalc

par [block] DependencyPar3

sadm08 : SafeguardElement

sadm21 : SafeguardElement
b

a
x : Real

cs : Real

c

sadm08ds

sadm21csd

a08d1

p08d : k1DependencyCalc

a08d : k1DependencyCalc

a21d : k4DependencyCalc

b

f

cs : Real

a

x : Real
sadm08csd

c

d

sadm21ds

c

b

sphy08csd

sadm16 : SafeguardElement
a

x : Real

x : Real

sadm16csd

sphy08ds

sphy08 : SafeguardElement

sadm20 : SafeguardElement
sadm16ds

a

e

a16d : k1DependencyCalc
b

sadm20ds

a

cs : Real

x : Real

a20d :
sadm20csd

c

cs : Real

cs : Real

a16d1

p08d1

k0DependencyCalc
b

a21d1

t02d :
k0DependencyCalc
b
a
sphy01 : SafeguardElement
stec02csd

a18d3

stec02ds

cs : Real

a18d2

stec02 : SafeguardElement
a17d4
x : Real

cs : Real

x : Real

a21d2
a17d2
sadm18 : SafeguardElement

a
p01d :

cs : Real

sadm18csd

b

sadm19 : SafeguardElement

b

k0DependencyCalc

d

e
a18d : k3DependencyCalc

a21d4
a18d1

c

cs : Real

x : Real

sadm18ds
x : Real

a17d3
a
sadm17 : SafeguardElement
d

e

sadm19csd

f
sadm17csd

cs : Real

a17d1

sadm19ds

b

b
a21d3

a17d
: k4DependencyCalc
c

a19d :

a
x : Real
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k0DependencyCalc

a

par [block] ContributorSubsystem

cpe02 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cpe02 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cti : Real

ctr : Real

c
c

cpr04 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

b

ctr : Real

c

cpr05 : ContributorElement

cpr05 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

ctr : Real

c

b

cti : Real

a04q : a04ConstraintCalc

a05q : a05ConstraintCalc

a

a

a

ctr : Real

c
c

a02q : a02ConstraintCalc

cti : Real

b

b

a01q : a01ConstraintCalc

cpe06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

d

b

b

a06q : a06ConstraintCalc

a07q : a07ConstraintCalc

a
a

a

cpe01 : ContributorElement

cpe01 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte03 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr07 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cpe06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cti : Real

b

cpe03 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr08 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

c

cpe03 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr05 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

c

cpe04 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cti : Real

b

ctr : Real

c

ctr : Real

cte05 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

a

a09q : a09ConstraintCalc
a

d

cti : Real

b

a10q : a10ConstraintCalc

d

ctr : Real

c

b

b

c
a08q : a08ConstraintCalc

cpr04 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

a12q : a12ConstraintCalc

a13q : a13ConstraintCalc

a

a

d

e

f

a

cpe02 : ContributorElement

cpe04 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr13 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cpe04 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

ctr : Real

c

b

a

c

cti : Real

cpe06 :

cpe05 :

cpe06 :

ContributorElement

ContributorElement

ContributorElement

cpr20 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

c

ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpe02 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

b

ctr : Real

c

ctr : Real

a

cte06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cte07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

a

cte07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe05 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

b

cte06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

a

cte07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cti : Real

ctr : Real

c

ctr : Real

b

t07q : t07ConstraintCalc
a

cte07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

d

cte06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real
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b

p07q : p07ConstraintCalc
a

cpe02 : ContributorElement

d

cte06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

c

cpe02 : ContributorElement

b

t05q : t05ConstraintCalc

d

ctr : Real

cpr23 : ContributorElement

b

t03q : t03ConstraintCalc

d

ctr : Real

ctr : Real

d

ctr : Real

cpe02 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

cpe07 :
ContributorElement

p06q : p06ConstraintCalc

cpe12 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe06 :
ContributorElement

ctr : Real

a

c
t01q : t01ConstraintCalc

cti : Real

d

cpe11 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe05 :
ContributorElement

ctr : Real

c

a

cpe04 :
ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr19 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

c
b
p05q : p05ConstraintCalc

d

cpe05 :

ctr : Real

cpr12 : ContributorElement

b

a

ContributorElement
ctr : Real

ctr : Real

cpr19 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

a15q : a15ConstraintCalc

d

cpe06 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpr14 : ContributorElement

cti : Real

a14q : a14ConstraintCalc

cpe07 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

cpe11 : ContributorElement

ctr : Real

ctr : Real

bdd [Package] ConfidentialityView

«block»
InformationSecuritySystem
values
p1 : Real
wv : Real [1..*]

1
1
pc
«constraint»
p1Calculation
constraints
{a=if(sum(b)>0,(b[0]*c+b[1]*d+b[22]*e+b[23]*f+b[24]*g+b[25]*h+b[26]*i+b[27]*j+b[32]*k+b[34]*l+b[33]*m+b[35]*n+b[13]*o+b[10]*p+b[7]*q+b[20]*r+b[18]*s+b[16]*t+b[15]*u+b[19]*v+b[28]*w+b[17]*x+b[2]*y+b[3]*z+b[12]*aa+b[4]*bb+b[5]*cc+b[9]*dd+b[8]*ee+b[6]*ff+b[29]*gg+b[14]*hh+b[11]*ii+b[23]*jj+b[30]*kk+b[31]*ll)/sum(b),0)}
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par [block] InformationSecuritySystem

part hippa
sadm01 : SafeguardElement

c

x : Real
sadm17 : SafeguardElement

t
sadm02 : SafeguardElement
x : Real
d

x : Real
sadm16 : SafeguardElement

u
sphy01 : SafeguardElement
x : Real
e

x : Real
sadm20 : SafeguardElement

sphy02 : SafeguardElement

v

x : Real
f

x : Real
sphy08 : SafeguardElement

sphy04 : SafeguardElement

w

x : Real
g

x : Real
sadm18 : SafeguardElement

sphy05 : SafeguardElement

x

x : Real

h

x : Real
sadm03 : SafeguardElement

y
sphy06 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
i

x : Real

a

sadm04 : SafeguardElement

p1 : Real
z

sphy07 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
j

x : Real
sadm13 : SafeguardElement
aa
stec04 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
k

x : Real
sadm05 : SafeguardElement
stec06 : SafeguardElement

bb

x : Real

pc : p1Calculation
l

x : Real
sadm06 : SafeguardElement

cc
stec05 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
m

x : Real
sadm10 : SafeguardElement

dd
stec07 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
n

x : Real
sadm09 : SafeguardElement
ee
sadm14 : SafeguardElement
x : Real
o

x : Real
sadm07 : SafeguardElement

ff
sadm11 : SafeguardElement
x : Real
p

x : Real
stec01 : SafeguardElement

gg
sadm08 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
q

x : Real
sadm15 : SafeguardElement
hh
sadm21 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
r

x : Real
sadm12 : SafeguardElement
ii
sadm19 : SafeguardElement

x : Real
s

x : Real
sphy03 : SafeguardElement

jj
stec02 : SafeguardElement

x : Real

kk

x : Real
stec03 : SafeguardElement

ll

x : Real
b

wv : Real
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Organization01 : Organization
healthcare = InformationSecuritySystem01

healthcare

InformationSecuritySystem01 :
InformationSecuritySystem
hippacontribs = ContributorSubsystem01
hippa = SafeguardSubsystem01

hippacontribs

hippa

p1 : Real = 0.0
wv : Real = 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, ...
ca01

ContributorSubsystem01 : ContributorSubsystem

sadm0101 :

cpe0101 :
ContributorElement

cte0101 :

cpe01

cte01

ctr : Real = 1.0

cti : Real
cpe0201 :

cte02
cpe02

cpr0101 :
cpr01

x : Real = 0.75

SafeguardElement

cte04

cti : Real

cs : Real = 0.8

cti : Real

x : Real = 0.8
cte0401 :

SafeguardElement

cte06
cpr0501 :
cpr05

ContributorElement

sadm0601 :
SafeguardElement

x : Real = 0.75

SafeguardElement

x : Real = 1.0
stec0701 :
x : Real = 0.8
sphy0601 :

sphy06

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 0.8

cpr0701 :

cti : Real
cpe0901 :

cte08

sadm0801 :

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement

x : Real = 0.8
sadm08
sphy07
sphy0701 :

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0
ctr : Real = 0.0, 0.0

cs : Real = ...

cti : Real

SafeguardElement

x : Real = ...

cti : Real = 0.0,,,,
cpe09

cs : Real = 0.75

ContributorElement

cpr08

sadm0901 :

cte0901 :

cpr0801 :

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement

ContributorElement

sphy08

ctr : Real = 0.0

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

cti : Real

cti : Real = 0.0,,,,,

cti : Real

cs : Real = 0.75

cpe1001 :
ContributorElement

cpr09

cpe10

ContributorElement

cs : Real = ...
SafeguardElement

cte1001 :

cte10

sadm10

ContributorElement
x : Real = 0.5

ctr : Real = 0.0
cti : Real

cs : Real = 0.5

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0
cti : Real

cti : Real

sadm1101 :

cpr1001 :
cpr10

cpe1101 :
ContributorElement

SafeguardElement

sadm11

ContributorElement
cs : Real = 0.8

cpe11

ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = 0.8

cti : Real
ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...
sadm1201 :

cpr1101 :

cti : Real

cpr11

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement

sadm12

cpe1201 :
ContributorElement

cpe12

ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = 0.5

cti : Real

cs : Real = 0.5

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...
cpr12

cpe1301 :
ContributorElement

sadm1301 :

cpr1201 :

cti : Real

cpe13

sadm13

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0

cs : Real = 0.875

cti : Real

x : Real = 0.8125

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...
sadm1401 :

cpr1301 :

cti : Real

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement

sadm14

cpr13
cs : Real = 0.8

ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = 0.8

cti : Real = 0.0,,,,,,

sadm1501 :

cpr1401 :
cpr14

sadm15

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement

cs : Real = 0.8

ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = ...

cti : Real = 0.0,,,,,

sadm1601 :
SafeguardElement

cpr1501 :
cpr15

ContributorElement

sadm16
cs : Real = ...

ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = ...

cti : Real
sadm1701 :
SafeguardElement

cpr1601 :

sadm17

ContributorElement
cpr16

cs : Real = 1.0
ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = ...

cti : Real
sadm1801 :
SafeguardElement

cpr1701 :
cpr17

ContributorElement
cs : Real = 1.0
ctr : Real = 0.0

sadm18

x : Real = 0.875

cti : Real
sadm1901 :
cpr18

sadm19

SafeguardElement

cpr1801 :
ContributorElement

cs : Real = ...
ctr : Real = 0.0

x : Real = ...

cti : Real
sadm2001 :

sadm20

SafeguardElement

cpr1901 :
cpr19

ContributorElement
cs : Real = ...
ctr : Real = 0.0, 0.0

x : Real = ...

cti : Real = 0.0, 0.0,,,,,
sadm2101 :
SafeguardElement
cpr20

cpr2001 :
ContributorElement

cs : Real = ...
x : Real = ...

ctr : Real = 0.0
cti : Real = 0.0,,,,
cpr21
cpr2101 :
ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0
cti : Real

cpr22

cpr2201 :
ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0, 0.0
cti : Real

cpr23

sphy0801 :
SafeguardElement

x : Real = 0.75
sadm1001 :

cpr0901 :

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

x : Real = 0.75

sadm09

cte09
ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

cpr2301 :
ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0
cti : Real = 0.0,,,,

Name: Instance01
FullScopedName: ISM::Instance01.Instance01
DynamicUmlClassName: Object Diagram
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stec07
cs : Real = 1.0
x : Real = 1.0

cs : Real = ...

cpr07

SafeguardElement

sadm07

x : Real = ...

ContributorElement

cpe08

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 1.0

cs : Real = 0.8
sadm0701 :

ContributorElement

cti : Real

cte0801 :

cpe0801 :

stec0601 :
stec06

sphy0501 :

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

ContributorElement

x : Real = 1.0

SafeguardElement

cte0701 :

cte07

ctr : Real = 0.0
cti : Real

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 1.0

sphy05

cs : Real = ...

ContributorElement

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...
cti : Real = ,,,,,,,,

ctr : Real = 1.0

stec0501 :
stec05

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 0.75

sadm06

x : Real = ...

cti : Real

cpr0601 :
cpr06

x : Real = 0.5

sphy04

x : Real = 0.75

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

cti : Real = 0.0, 0.0, 0.0,,,
cpe07

cs : Real = 0.75

cte0601 :

ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0, 0.0, 0.0

cti : Real = 1.0,,,,,

ContributorElement

sadm05

sphy0401 :

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 1.0
x : Real = 1.0

cs : Real = ...

sadm0501 :
SafeguardElement

cti : Real = 0.0, 0.0, 0.0, ...

ctr : Real = 0.0, 0.0

cpe06

stec04

sphy0301 :
SafeguardElement

ctr : Real = 1.0

cti : Real = 0.0, 0.0,,,,
cpe0601 :

stec0401 :
cs : Real = 1.0

sphy03

x : Real = ...

ContributorElement
ContributorElement
cpr04

cti : Real

x : Real = 1.0

cte0501 :

cte05
cpr0401 :

cpe05

sphy02

sadm04

cs : Real = ...

cti : Real

cti : Real
cpe0501 :

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 1.0

SafeguardElement

x : Real = ...
ctr : Real = 1.0

ctr : Real = 0.0

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

stec03

sphy0201 :

ContributorElement

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...
cti : Real

cs : Real = 1.0

sadm0401 :

ContributorElement

cpr0301 :
cpr03

stec0301 :
sadm03

x : Real = 1.0
ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0

cpe0401 :
cpe04

x : Real = 0.5

SafeguardElement

sadm0301 :

ContributorElement

ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 0.5

sphy0101 :
sphy01

cte0301 :
cpr0201 :
cpr02

stec02

x : Real = ...

cte03

cti : Real
cpe03

stec0201 :

sadm02

SafeguardElement
cs : Real = 0.75

cti : Real

cpe0301 :

cti : Real

cpe0701 :

sadm0201 :

cte0201 :
ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

ContributorElement

cs : Real = 0.75

ContributorElement
ctr : Real = 0.0

cti : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

ContributorElement

SafeguardElement

sadm01

x : Real = ...

cti : Real

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0, ...

ContributorElement

stec0101 :
stec01

SafeguardElement

ContributorElement
cs : Real = ...

ctr : Real = 1.0, 1.0, 1.0

ContributorElement

SafeguardSubsystem01 : SafeguardSubsystem

sadm21

x : Real = ...

APPENDIX B: PARASOLVER OUTPUT
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Safeguard
Risk Analysis
Risk Management
Sanction Policy
Information System Activity Review
Authorization and/or Supervision
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Termination Procedures
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function
Access Authorization
Access Establishment and Modification
Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious Software
Log-in Monitoring
Password Management
Response and Reporting
Data Backup Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Testing and Revision Procedure
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Maintenance Records
Disposal
Media Re-use
Accountability
Data Backup and Storage
Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Integrity Controls
Encryption

Verification Experiment: All ctr = 1.00
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Administrative S-Adm-01
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-02
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-03
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-04
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-05
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-06
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-07
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-08
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-09
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-10
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-11
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-12
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-13
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-14
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-15
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-16
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-17
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-18
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-19
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-20
1.000
1.00
Administrative S-Adm-21
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-01
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-02
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-03
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-04
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-05
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-06
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-07
1.000
1.00
Physical
S-Phy-08
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-01
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-02
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-03
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-04
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-05
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-06
1.000
1.00
Technical
S-Tec-07
1.000
1.00
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1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

p1 value
1.000

Safeguard
Risk Analysis
Risk Management
Sanction Policy
Information System Activity Review
Authorization and/or Supervision
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Termination Procedures
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function
Access Authorization
Access Establishment and Modification
Security Reminders
Protection from Malicious Software
Log-in Monitoring
Password Management
Response and Reporting
Data Backup Plan
Disaster Recovery Plan
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Testing and Revision Procedure
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Contingency Operations
Facility Security Plan
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Maintenance Records
Disposal
Media Re-use
Accountability
Data Backup and Storage
Unique User Identification
Emergency Access Procedure
Automatic Logoff
Encryption and Decryption
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Integrity Controls
Encryption

Verification Experiment: All ctr = 0.00
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.667
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.708
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.800
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.804
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.750
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.667
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.778
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-08
0.667
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.750
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.500
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.800
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.500
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.813
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.800
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.758
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.667
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.833
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.875
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.833
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.667
0.00
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.667
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-01
1.000
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.854
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.500
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.750
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.800
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.800
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.750
0.00
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.667
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.750
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.500
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-03
1.000
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-04
1.000
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-05
1.000
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-06
1.000
0.00
Technical
S-Tec-07
1.000
0.00
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0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

p1 value
0.000

Experiment: People ctr = 0.00, Process ctr = 0.00, Technology ctr = 1.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.000
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.125
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.200
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.429
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.250
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.229
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.167
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
0.000
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.250
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.167
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.200
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.000
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.375
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.300
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.000
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.167
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.000
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.000
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.000
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.000
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.000
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
0.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.000
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.250
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.250
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.400
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.400
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.250
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.333
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.500
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.000
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
0.667
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
0.667
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
0.667
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
0.667
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
0.667
1.00
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0.000
0.125
0.200
0.429
0.250
0.229
0.167
0.000
0.250
0.167
0.200
0.000
0.375
0.300
0.000
0.167
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.250
0.250
0.400
0.400
0.250
0.333
0.500
0.000
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667

p1 value
0.238

Experiment: People ctr = 0.00, Process ctr = 1.00, Technology ctr = 0.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.333
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.250
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.067
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.000
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.000
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.000
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.056
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
0.000
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.000
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.167
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.200
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.250
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.000
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.000
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.000
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.333
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.000
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.000
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.167
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.333
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.167
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
0.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.000
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.222
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.250
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.000
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.000
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.000
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.333
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.000
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.500
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
0.000
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
0.000
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
0.000
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
0.000
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
0.000
1.00
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0.333
0.250
0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.056
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.200
0.250
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.333
0.167
0.000
0.000
0.222
0.250
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.500
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

p1 value
0.101

Experiment: People ctr = 0.00, Process ctr = 1.00, Technology ctr = 1.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.333
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.417
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.400
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.571
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.250
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.333
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.333
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
0.000
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.250
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.375
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.400
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.500
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.375
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.400
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.000
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.500
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.000
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.000
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.167
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.333
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.233
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
0.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.000
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.472
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.500
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.400
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.400
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.250
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.667
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.750
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.500
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
0.667
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
0.667
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
0.667
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
0.667
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
0.667
1.00
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0.333
0.417
0.400
0.571
0.250
0.333
0.333
0.000
0.250
0.375
0.400
0.500
0.375
0.400
0.000
0.500
0.000
0.000
0.167
0.333
0.233
0.000
0.000
0.472
0.500
0.400
0.400
0.250
0.667
0.750
0.500
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667
0.667

p1 value
0.373

Experiment: People ctr = 1.00, Process ctr = 0.00, Technology ctr = 0.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.667
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.500
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.510
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.339
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.500
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.333
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.472
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
0.667
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.500
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.333
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.600
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.500
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.375
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.400
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.557
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.333
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.767
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.792
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.833
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.667
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.667
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
1.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.792
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.333
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.500
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.400
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.400
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.450
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.333
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.250
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.500
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
0.000
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
0.333
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
0.000
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
0.222
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
0.000
1.00
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0.667
0.500
0.510
0.339
0.500
0.333
0.472
0.667
0.500
0.333
0.600
0.500
0.375
0.400
0.557
0.333
0.767
0.792
0.833
0.667
0.667
1.000
0.792
0.333
0.500
0.400
0.400
0.450
0.333
0.250
0.500
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.222
0.000

p1 value
0.467

Experiment: People ctr = 1.00, Process ctr = 0.00, Technology ctr = 1.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
0.667
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.708
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.800
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.804
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.750
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.667
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.778
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
0.667
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.750
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.500
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.800
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.500
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.813
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.800
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.758
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.667
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.833
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.875
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
0.833
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
0.667
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.667
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
1.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.854
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.639
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.750
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.800
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.800
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.750
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.667
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.750
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
0.500
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
1.000
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
1.000
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
1.000
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
1.000
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
1.000
1.00
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0.667
0.708
0.800
0.804
0.750
0.667
0.778
0.667
0.750
0.500
0.800
0.500
0.813
0.800
0.758
0.667
0.833
0.875
0.833
0.667
0.667
1.000
0.854
0.639
0.750
0.800
0.800
0.750
0.667
0.750
0.500
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

p1 value
0.773

Experiment: People ctr = 1.00, Process ctr = 1.00, Technology ctr = 0.00
Safeguard
Type
ID
Dependency Score (x) Confidentiality Weight (w)
Risk Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-01
1.000
1.00
Risk Management
Administrative S-Adm-02
0.750
1.00
Sanction Policy
Administrative S-Adm-03
0.618
1.00
Information System Activity Review
Administrative S-Adm-04
0.339
1.00
Authorization and/or Supervision
Administrative S-Adm-05
0.750
1.00
Workforce Clearance Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-06
0.667
1.00
Termination Procedures
Administrative S-Adm-07
0.611
1.00
Isolating Healthcare Clearinghouse Function Administrative S-Adm-08
1.000
1.00
Access Authorization
Administrative S-Adm-09
0.750
1.00
Access Establishment and Modification
Administrative S-Adm-10
0.792
1.00
Security Reminders
Administrative S-Adm-11
0.800
1.00
Protection from Malicious Software
Administrative S-Adm-12
0.750
1.00
Log-in Monitoring
Administrative S-Adm-13
0.438
1.00
Password Management
Administrative S-Adm-14
0.600
1.00
Response and Reporting
Administrative S-Adm-15
0.701
1.00
Data Backup Plan
Administrative S-Adm-16
0.667
1.00
Disaster Recovery Plan
Administrative S-Adm-17
0.933
1.00
Emergency Mode Operation Plan
Administrative S-Adm-18
0.917
1.00
Testing and Revision Procedure
Administrative S-Adm-19
1.000
1.00
Applications and Data Criticality Analysis
Administrative S-Adm-20
1.000
1.00
Written Contract or Other Arrangement
Administrative S-Adm-21
0.933
1.00
Contingency Operations
Physical
S-Phy-01
1.000
1.00
Facility Security Plan
Physical
S-Phy-02
0.938
1.00
Access Control and Validation Procedures
Physical
S-Phy-03
0.667
1.00
Maintenance Records
Physical
S-Phy-04
0.750
1.00
Disposal
Physical
S-Phy-05
0.600
1.00
Media Re-use
Physical
S-Phy-06
0.600
1.00
Accountability
Physical
S-Phy-07
0.675
1.00
Data Backup and Storage
Physical
S-Phy-08
0.667
1.00
Unique User Identification
Technical
S-Tec-01
0.250
1.00
Emergency Access Procedure
Technical
S-Tec-02
1.000
1.00
Automatic Logoff
Technical
S-Tec-03
0.000
1.00
Encryption and Decryption
Technical
S-Tec-04
0.333
1.00
Mechanism to Authenticate EPHI
Technical
S-Tec-05
0.000
1.00
Integrity Controls
Technical
S-Tec-06
0.222
1.00
Encryption
Technical
S-Tec-07
0.000
1.00
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1.000
0.750
0.618
0.339
0.750
0.667
0.611
1.000
0.750
0.792
0.800
0.750
0.438
0.600
0.701
0.667
0.933
0.917
1.000
1.000
0.933
1.000
0.938
0.667
0.750
0.600
0.600
0.675
0.667
0.250
1.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.222
0.000

p1 value
0.659
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